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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IS AN INVIOLABLE CONSTITUTION A SUICIDE PACT?
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON EXECUTIVE POWER TO
PROTECT THE SALUS POPULI

RYAN PATRICK ALFORD*
INTRODUCTION
One of the thorniest issues ever put to jurists of the western legal tradition
is the question of the proper scope of executive powers in a time of crisis. It
has been disputed vigorously during key episodes in history; this has helped to
define the boundaries of constitutional government against tyranny, absolute
monarchy, and dictatorships. Despite apparently decisive rejections of
overbroad executive powers at formative moments of legal history, the issue
has proven itself perennial; even as threats to the state take on ever more
frightening proportions, the issue is repeatedly reopened.
A written constitution can be seen as an attempt on the part of a nation to
tie itself to the mast of the rule of law, such that no emergency can tempt the
people to dispense with the principle that they are governed by laws, and not
by men. However, the idea that the chief executive should have the power to
dispense with impediments to his effective management of a crisis has proven
itself a powerful siren song. The traditional rebuttal to those who have insisted
on inflexible adherence to the written text has been the rhetorical assertion
attributed to Justice Goldberg, who declared that “while the Constitution
protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”1 This
argument fails to note that in the same opinion, in a passage that is less wellknown than Goldberg’s pithy epigram, he also stated:
The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due
process under the gravest of emergencies has existed throughout our
constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis, that

* Assistant Professor, Ave Maria School of Law. Special thanks to my research assistants Jason
Gardner and Peter Schofield, and to the staff of Ave Maria School of Law Library for their able
and diligent assistance. Thanks also to the organizers and presenters at the 2012 Southeastern
Law Scholars Conference and the 11th Circuit Legal Scholars Forums for their valuable feedback
on an early draft of this Article.
1. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
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there is the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional
2
guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit governmental action.

Ever since Polybius, constitutional theorists have grappled with the correct
balance between adherence to fixed legal principles and the desire for
flexibility in protecting the public welfare during times of war, rebellion, and
political crisis. Polybius believed in a cycle of constitutions, in which every
democracy will inevitably devolve into a dictatorship.3 His work proved
prescient; history is replete with examples of tyrants who rose to power out of
the ashes of the constitutional crises that led to broad grants of emergency
powers, of which Julius Caesar, Oliver Cromwell, and Napoleon Bonaparte are
only the most prominent examples. However, as Aristotle countered,
constitutional government has proven surprisingly resilient despite these
reversals of fortune, coming back in ever-stronger forms after periods of
tyranny and repression.4
In recent years, rather than asking the historical question of whether the
Framers of the Constitution of the United States had a particular intention to
grant the executive emergency powers to disregard specific constitutional
protections during a crisis, many American legal theorists have turned instead
to the philosophical question of whether a constitution must, by necessity,
contain such a provision. These theorists (among them, John Yoo, Richard
Posner, and the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist) have pointed to events
subsequent to the founding to argue that the Framers could not possibly have
meant to prevent such great presidents as Thomas Jefferson and Abraham
Lincoln from overstepping the letter of the law.
These arguments have taken on a new prominence—and a darker
countenance—in the wake of terrorist attacks on the United States. Certain
theorists now argue that we must balance our liberties against the very real
threat of catastrophic shocks to the nation. These assertions require a serious
and thoughtful response. What light can legal history shed on this issue? One
must first consider how the issue has been framed: Michael Stokes Paulsen has
argued that the President has an implied constitutional power to declare an
emergency after detecting a serious threat to the state, and accordingly he has a
constitutional power to take any action he deems necessary to deal with this
situation, up to and including authorizing acts of war and torture.5

2. Id. at 165.
3. See POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES bk. VI, at 287–89 (W.R. Paton trans., Harvard Univ.
Press 1954).
4. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. IV, at 325–35 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1977).
5. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257,
1258, 1280, 1282 (2004).
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Legal history can be used to prove three relevant points in refutation of
Paulsen’s assertion. First, the greatest minds of a constitutional tradition that
stretches across millennia have described this as the idea most dangerous to
both democracy and constitutionalism itself. Second, no constitutional order
has ever tolerated such a broad principle of executive privilege, although it has
been repeatedly advocated by legal theorists in support of absolutism. Third,
the Framers not only did not include an implicit principle of this type in the
Constitution of the United States, but also possessed no inclination to do so,
such that it is absurd to imagine that they would have failed to make their
departure from millennia of constitutional tradition explicit.
I. NECESSITY, THE SALUS POPULI, AND THE RULE OF LAW
A.

The Argument that Safety Demands a Constitutional Doctrine of Necessity

Paulsen is very frank in his advocacy of the proposition that the President
has the power to ignore explicit constitutional restraints on his powers
whenever he believes he must act to protect the public welfare during an
emergency:
The Constitution itself embraces an overriding principle of constitutional and
national self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule of construction for the
document’s specific provisions and that may even, in cases of extraordinary
necessity, trump specific constitutional requirements. . . .
. . . In short, the Constitution either creates or recognizes a constitutional
law of necessity, and appears to charge the President with the primary duty of
6
applying it and judging the degree of necessity in the press of circumstances.

From the point of view of legal history, this description of the President’s
powers is simply astonishing. It would invest him not only with authority that
far exceeds that of George III, but one that exceeds even the absolutist
impulses of the Stuart monarchs. To find an English king with emergency
powers this broad, one must reach back across the Middle Ages to a time
before these kings recognized that the Magna Carta bound them to the rule of
law, that is, to the reign of Edward II.7 Paulsen explicitly sidesteps the
argument that the Framers could not have wished to grant the President powers
that were substantially greater than any English monarch,8 and instead insists
that this is a necessary feature of any durable constitutional order: “Either a
constitutional law of necessity exists or it does not. . . . [I]f it does not, the
Constitution is a suicide pact.”9
6. Id. at 1257–58.
7. See Ryan Patrick Alford, The Rule of Law at the Crossroads: Consequences of Targeted
Killing of Citizens, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1203, 1204–06.
8. Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1287–89.
9. Id. at 1259.
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His argument countenances no limits on what the President can do when
faced with an emergency, which he alone has the power to define.10 Paulsen
explicitly states that this would make torture not merely morally defensible but
constitutional.11 Foreshadowing Judge Posner’s arguments,12 Paulsen states
that “[t]he reasonableness of the intrusion is a function of the circumstances,
and the magnitude of the imminent danger can justify what otherwise might be
. . . unreasonable.”13 Accordingly, Paulsen provides a justification for John
Yoo’s argument that no law or treaty could be passed that could prevent the
President from crushing the testicles of a terrorist’s child in a vise, should he
believe that this would save American lives.14 Indeed, Paulsen argues that the
President is obliged to violate specific provisions of the Constitution in such an
emergency, and that he should use every possible tool at his disposal:
The first duty of the President of the United States is to preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution of the United States by preserving, protecting, and
defending the United States, by every indispensible means within his power.
. . . [T]he existence of such a constitutional duty of the President very strongly
implies the existence of legitimate constitutional power on the part of the
15
President to carry out that duty.

Despite the apparently radical nature of this position—reminiscent of a
claim that one must sometimes destroy something in order to save it—this
interpretation of the Constitution has been influential. Oren Gross has provided
substantial scholarly support for Paulsen’s thesis.16 Gross argues that the rule
of law is a “Business as Usual model,” which disregards the actual use of
emergency powers by the executive in times of emergency, which, following
principles of legal realism, are actually embedded within the constitutional
order.17 Gross describes the “radical solution” to the problem of terrorism as
one that acknowledges:
Legal rules and norms are too inflexible and rigid to accommodate the security
needs of states. . . . Maxims such as “necessity knows no law,” “salus populi
suprema lex est,” “inter arma silent leges,” and “raison d’état” reflect this

10. Id. at 1291.
11. Id. at 1280.
12. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 14 (2006).
13. Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1280.
14. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 110TH CONG., REINING IN THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESIDENCY OF
GEORGE W. BUSH 113–14, 126 (Comm. Print 2009).
15. Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1263.
16. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional? 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1028–29, 1036, 1039, 1041–42, 1134 (2003).
17. Id. at 1021–23.
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approach. Where the survival (or fundamental interest of the state) is
18
concerned, there ought to be no holding back on governmental action . . . .

Gross concludes that “[t]here may be circumstances when it would be
appropriate to go outside the legal order, at times even violating otherwise
accepted constitutional dictates, when responding to emergency situations.”19
Other theorists reach this same conclusion for similar reasons, including John
Yoo,20 Thomas Crocker,21 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule,22 and Richard
Seamon.23 Other scholars disagree with Paulsen. Kevin Jon Heller has pointed
out there is great danger inherent in the argument that the President alone can
declare the emergency and determine both the scope of his constitutional
powers and the appropriateness of the response that he chooses.24 He notes
how the nature of the emergency that Paulsen believes requires the President to
override specific constitutional rights shifts in the course of his article from “a
nation-destroying outcome” to situations where there is merely a “prospect of
grave risk or danger to the nation.”25
It was a commonplace of classical political theory that assertions of threats
of this kind are endemic to constitutional states, since this is the manner in
which the executive branch of government typically seeks to extend its powers.
Consequently, constitutional theorists across millennia (many of whom were
known to and respected by the Framers) have rejected the emergency-based
rationale for the expansion of executive powers. Indeed, it will be
demonstrated below that the development of both the notion of constitutional
government and the rule of law often stems from resistance to these claims on
the part of consuls, emperors, and kings.
At the time that Paulsen first made his argument, it appeared as if the
United States might make a dramatic break with the western constitutional
tradition. Writing in 2006, Sanford Levinson argued that “[i]t is not, I believe,
an exaggeration to view us as approaching what Bruce Ackerman has famously
labeled a ‘constitutional moment,’ with the possibility of attendant

18. Id. at 1042.
19. Id. at 1134.
20. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 5, 8–9 (2005).
21. Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of Constitutional
Culture, 61 SMU L. REV. 221, 278 (2008).
22. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV.
605, 644 (2003).
23. Richard Henry Seamon, Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists: Presidential
Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449, 504 (2008).
24. Kevin Jon Heller, The Rhetoric of Necessity (Or, Sanford Levinson’s Pinteresque
Conversation), 40 GA. L. REV. 779, 804 (2006).
25. Id. at 788, 790 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1269, 1275).
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fundamental transformation,”26 brought about by sweeping assertions of
executive power to ignore the laws during the period of crisis following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.27
During this period, “President George W. Bush claim[ed] monarchlike
authority . . . to flout any statute . . . [prohibiting] warrantless electronic
surveillance, breaking and entering, mail openings or torture.”28 During the
three years following, however, it appeared as if the legal system had rebuked
these assertions, after the U.S. Supreme Court penned its decisions in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld29 and Boumediene v. Bush,30 and after the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) repealed the memoranda31 asserting that the President had the
constitutional power to take the nation to war without congressional
approval,32 to authorize forms of interrogation that were inconsistent with the
Convention Against Torture,33 and to ignore laws prohibiting warrantless
wiretapping.34 It appeared as if jurists had concluded that this vision of
executive power was incompatible with the vision of separation of powers and
the rule of law embodied by the Constitution.
The “constitutional moment” had passed—or so it seemed. In 2011,
another critical moment seemed to be upon us. The President asserted and

26. Sanford Levinson, The Deepening Crisis of American Constitutionalism, 40 GA. L. REV.
889, 891–92 (2006).
27. See also David Cole, After September 11: What We Still Don’t Know, THE N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/sep/29/after-september11-what-we-still-dont-know/.
28. Levinson, supra note 26, at 892 (quoting Bruce Fein, Commentary, Hemlock Hallmarks,
WASH. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2006), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/apr/10/20060410091458-8835r/).
29. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).
30. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008).
31. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, Re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001, at 2 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/docu
ments/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf.
32. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
to the Deputy Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct
Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), available
at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm.
33. Memorandum Opinion from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, Military Interrogation of Alien
Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States 16, 49 (Mar. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf; see also 18 U.S.C. § 242
(2010).
34. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President *1, *8 (2006).
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exercised, on the basis of nothing more than a secret OLC memorandum,35 that
he has the power to kill an American citizen accused of terrorism without trial,
in direct violation of the Treason and Bill of Attainder Clauses.36 His Secretary
of State now asserts37 that the President has the power to continue hostilities
with a foreign nation in contravention of the War Powers Resolution of 1973,38
even if Congress were to pass a bill curtailing that mission.39 The fact that John
Yoo is applauding this assertion of presidential power should give pause to
those who believe that the threat to the rule of law ended with the election of
President Obama. Yoo argues persuasively that the administration has
implicitly adopted his view of the President’s constitutional powers;40 this
President, or his successor, might as easily adopt Paulsen’s.
Accordingly, it is now incumbent upon legal historians to return to the
argument made by Paulsen, Gross, and others who claim that a constitutional
order logically entails a doctrine of necessity that trumps citizens’
constitutional rights. That this task should be entrusted to legal historians is
supported by Saikrishna Prakash’s excellent analysis of Paulsen’s article.41
Prakash reasons as follows:
Paulsen regards it as obvious that any constitution without a rule of necessity is
deeply flawed. . . .
. . . [But] constitutional framers might value other things . . . more than the
durability of the constitution and the nation. In particular, constitutional
framers might not wish to frame a constitution that permits the expedient
sacrifice of such principles, even temporarily. Moreover, constitution-makers
might believe that officials will violate the constitution on grounds of necessity
anyway, and that we ought not to multiply those violations by explicitly
42
sanctioning what otherwise might occur once in a blue moon.

The possibility that the Framers valued the rule of law more than anything
else should be taken seriously, as they risked being attainted and executed as
traitors—largely due to their belief that Parliament was violating their

35. Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2011, at 1.
36. Alford, supra note 7, at 1210–17.
37. Charlie Savage, Clock Ticking on War Powers Resolution, THE CAUCUS: THE POLITICS
AND GOV’T BLOG OF THE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2011, 6:21 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/04/01/clock-ticking-on-war-powers-resolution/.
38. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2011).
39. Savage, supra note 37.
40. John Yoo, Antiwar Senator, War-Powers President, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2011, at A17.
41. Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1299,
1300 (2004).
42. Id.
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constitutional rights as freeborn Englishmen.43 Moreover, Prakash correctly
notes that this is not merely a question of what any individual founding father
might have believed; it is a question about the range of opinions upon which
they might have drawn, such that they could be considered to have left a
monumentally important question of executive power implicit in a
constitutional text that is otherwise explicit and restrictive in its treatment of
delegated powers:
Paulsen’s claim ultimately rests on the historical understanding of executive
power . . . .
. . . I know of no history suggesting that the executive branch . . . w[as]
given the constitutional power to suspend [its] constitutions in times of crisis.
English history, at least, suggests that chief executives enjoyed no such
44
power.

As this Article will establish, this is indeed a correct assessment of English
law. However, the Framers were well-read and drew upon many other
sources.45 As Gross noted, “[I]ssues . . . such as how a constitutional regime
should respond to violent challenges . . . [are] as ancient as the Roman
Republic,”46 something which no doubt led him to consider the enduring
appeal of “[m]axims such as . . . salus populi suprema lex est.”47 Accordingly,
to rebut Paulsen’s historical oversights more adequately, one should first
consider in detail Prakash’s claim that “no . . . executive branch [in a
constitutional government] w[as] given the constitutional power” to dispense
with the laws in order to protect the public welfare.48 As will be demonstrated
below, he is correct; from the time of the Roman Republic to the time of the
Framing, no government that can be considered constitutional (including the
Roman Principate, the Dominate, the Byzantine Empire, and medieval
constitutionalist monarchies) has ever embraced a theory of a metaconstitutional principle which claims that because salus populi suprema lex est
the executive has the power to dispense with fundamental rights in a crisis.

43. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 14–17 (1988).
44. Prakash, supra note 41, at 1301–02.
45. PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750–1776, at 28–29 (Bernard Bailyn ed.,
1965) (“What brought these disparate strands of [intellectual influences] together, what
dominated the colonists’ miscellaneous learning and shaped it into a coherent whole, was the
influence of . . . [a] tradition [which] lay in the radical social and political thought of the English
Civil War and of the Commonwealth period . . . . The colonists identified themselves with these
seventeenth-century heroes of liberty.”) (emphasis added).
46. Gross, supra note 16, at 1014.
47. Id. at 1042 (internal quotations omitted).
48. Prakash, supra note 41, at 1301–02.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

B.

IS AN INVIOLABLE CONSTITUTION A SUICIDE PACT?

363

The Article’s Use of Legal History to Rebut this Argument About
Necessity

To demonstrate that none of the constitutional regimes that might have
served as a precedent for the Framers embraced unbounded executive power to
defend the salus populi as detailed above, this Article will first address the
origins of this maxim and its implicit acceptance of the limits of executive
power, as embodied by the prevailing constitutional norms of Roman law,
which later served as the foundations upon which all conceptions of monarchic
and presidential power in western law ultimately rest.49 It will be demonstrated
that significant constitutional restrictions persisted during the imperial periods,
which are codified in the Corpus Iuris Civilis and which defined the theory and
limits of the Byzantine emperors’ powers.50
This Article will then detail how the theories of imperial power found in
the Corpus were elaborated upon by late medieval jurists. Building upon
Roman jurisprudence, these theorists carefully delimited the powers of the
Pope and Holy Roman Emperor (and later, kings) to prevent them from
dispensing with the emerging norms of judicial process in emergencies. This
theory of limitations on regal power, which is called medieval
constitutionalism,51 had a formative influence on the common law, as can be
seen in the discussion of the works of Henry of Bracton and Sir John
Fortescue.
This Article will then discuss the emergence of a theory of undivided and
unlimited sovereignty possessed by kings, which is first found in the work of
the French theorist Jean Bodin, whose revolutionary views supported an
absolutist French monarchy that abandoned constitutional limits during the
French Wars of Religion. In England, Bodin’s theories would influence James
I, Sir Francis Bacon, and Thomas Hobbes. However, as will be detailed below,
these ideas and the theory of emergency executive powers to defend the
welfare of the people were rejected and anathemized within Anglo-American
constitutional theory during the late seventeenth century.
Even treatises that include a reference to the maxim salus populi suprema
lex est demonstrate this rejection of broad emergency powers to ignore the
constitution when defending the state. While Sir Francis Bacon attempted to
advocate for this theory of the defense of the salus populi, and despite his
maxims becoming a seminal early source of common law principles, his views
were rejected in every later collection of maxims, including those that
influenced the Framers.

49. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 204 (1983).
50. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW 13 (2004).
51. See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 14–
17 (1947).
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Lastly, it will be demonstrated that John Locke’s comments on the salus
populi do not provide any basis to assume that the Framers could have relied
upon his views in creating an implied executive power to ignore the
constitution when protecting the public welfare. Rather they would have read
him as presenting a diametrically opposite view to Hobbes’s ideas about
sovereignty, which were universally unpopular among the founders’
generation. When confronted with the choice of sovereigntist or
constitutionalist theory, the Framers clearly chose the latter. Their heroes were
Locke, Lord Coke, and Sir Matthew Hale, and the villains of their historical
narrative were Hobbes, James I, and the English politicians who had later
adopted a theory of an omnipotent parliament.
The Framers drew upon a diverse set of intellectual influences. Foremost
among these were the works of enlightenment philosophers such as Locke, the
common law, the writings of the constitutionalist heroes in the struggle against
Stuart absolutism, and classical sources. None of these influences would have
led them to adopt the theory of executive powers to defend the public welfare
that Paulsen and others believe is implicit within the Constitution of the United
States. It will be evident at the conclusion of this Article that there is no basis
to think that the Framers, had they adopted a point of view on executive power
that entailed a rejection of all their key intellectual influences, would have left
such a rejection only implicitly in the text of the Constitution.
II. CICERO ON SALUS POPULI AND HIS ROMAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Since the maxim salus populi suprema lex est is thought to have been
coined by Marcus Tullius Cicero,52 the first task is to understand the meaning
it was given in De Legibus, which is not a description of the legal order of the
late republic, but rather a proposal for its reform.53 To appreciate the nature of
Cicero’s appeal to the idea of public safety, one must put in context his
proposals for constitutional change. By first detailing the existing Roman
constitution and earlier hostility to Cicero’s ideas about how it included a
metaprinciple of self-preservation by the executive, it will be possible to
explain more adequately what Cicero meant to say later in The Laws and why
he abandoned his attempts to argue for extraordinary executive powers.
As will be established in this Part, when Cicero wrote The Laws, the
Consuls did not possess a constitutional privilege to act outside of the laws to
safeguard the security of the state, even when the Senate granted them
emergency powers to deal with serious civil strife. While Cicero had earlier
been a vocal supporter of the proposition that the constitution did grant the

52. JON R. STONE, THE ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF LATIN QUOTATIONS 202 (2005).
53. ANTHONY EVERITT, CICERO: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ROME’S GREATEST POLITICIAN
179–80 (2003).
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Consuls (via the Senate) these sorts of powers in emergencies,54 by this time
his argument had been decisively rejected.55 Accordingly, by the time that he
composed The Laws, he was aware that this would not have been a viable
position, and he did not advocate its adoption.56
Detailed attention to Cicero’s arguments in the trials of Gaius Rabirius,
Publius Cornelius Lentulus, and those made in his own defense reveal the
limited scope of late republican emergency executive. Cicero was foremost a
rhetorician and an advocate.57 However, he had sought not only to defend his
clients, but also to urge a program of law reform that included a substantial
expansion of emergency powers.58 Had this been accepted, late republican
Rome would have had a constitution of the type that Paulsen and the others
cited above would clearly approve, as the Consuls would have the same
implicit powers they believe the President has under the Constitution of the
United States. Cicero’s arguments, however, were rejected so forcefully that in
his later efforts at comprehensive law reform, he abandoned this goal.59 One
must first understand the limited scope of his later proposals before attempting
to discern the precise meaning of his most quoted phrase.
A.

The Origin of the Maxim in De Legibus

Cicero wrote The Laws between 51 and 46 B.C.60 In Book Three, he makes
what he clearly considered plausible proposals for reform, which were not
radical, but merely “a revived version of the Roman Constitution described in
the Republic.”61 Nevertheless, some of his proposals are novel, most

54. OREN GROSS AND FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY
POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 148 (2006).
55. See infra Part II.B.
56. Much of Roman law has been misinterpreted because modern legal commentators fail to
note that the sources that many earlier writers have relied upon are extremely partial. Cicero
himself is the epitome of a partial source, and many generations of students who have been
exposed to Cicero because of his excellent prose have failed to note that his biases color his
interpretation of the Roman constitution. For instance, many commentators have concluded that
the maxim inter arma silent leges (during a time of war, the laws are mute) is an accurate
description of Roman law, on the basis of Cicero’s speech for the defense of Titus Annius Milo
(Pro Milone), which was widely disseminated, ignoring the historical account of the verdict,
which was not. That is most unfortunate, since Cicero’s argument that Milo’s killing of Publius
Clodius Pulcher was not a crime was rejected by the court, which levied on the defendant a
sentence of internal exile, the highest punishment available at the time. This is only one example
of misinterpretation among many.
57. RANDALL LESAFFER, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 90–91 (2009).
58. See infra Part II.B.
59. See infra Part II.B.
60. CICERO, THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS, at xxiii (Niall Rudd trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1998) (51–46 B.C.E.).
61. Id. at xxv.
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pertinently his idea that the Senate should have greater powers in
emergencies.62 However, close attention to the passage where the maxim is
coined reveals that by 51 B.C., Cicero was no longer advocating for an
extraordinary executive power to protect the public welfare.
First, one should note that “the welfare of the people is the supreme law” is
not an accurate translation of the relevant Latin phrase, which is “ollis salus
populi suprema lex esto,” and not “salus populi suprema lex est,” (as Gross
and others render it).63 This paraphrase omits any reference to the vital
pronoun ollis, which precedes the phrase and to some degree explains it, along
with the hortatory element of future imperative tense. A better translation,
then, is as follows: to him (the Consul) the welfare of the people shall be the
highest principle. Recognizing that this maxim functioned as an exhortation to
the Consuls is of particular importance to our understanding of its correct
meaning; examining Cicero’s particular purposes in making the proposals
found in The Laws is vital. That said, even at this stage one can already see that
the maxim is not evidence of a principle of constitutional interpretation, since
it is directed solely at the Consuls.
This phrase is found in Cicero’s discussion of powers of the Senate, shortly
before he lays out his proposal for its new emergency powers.64 It is not the
Senate that is to be guided by this maxim, but rather the Consuls, who are to be
wholly subordinate to that legislative body.65 It is for this reason that
commentators normally view the function of the maxim in this section as
largely rhetorical, as Keyes notes: “The only other possible interpretation—one
which has been universally rejected as unthinkable—seems to be the literal one
that Cicero actually intended to place the consuls above the law.”66
Dyck suggests that this misinterpretation only appears plausible because of
the “tendency to take lex in this sentence too literally; the suprema lex is surely
‘the supreme principle’ for their conduct of office.”67 He advances other
textual evidence for this view, arguing that the phrase is merely a paraphrase of
a statement of the Consuls’ duties: animum . . . saluti populi consulentem.68 On
this view, Cicero is admonishing the Consuls to consider the welfare of the
people and not their own interests when performing their duties. Had he
believed that their will was law when they perceived a danger to the public, the

62. Id.
63. Gross, supra note 16, at 1042.
64. ANDREW R. DYCK, A COMMENTARY ON CICERO, DE LEGIBUS 459 (2004).
65. We must leave aside for the moment the question of whether the Roman Senate can be
properly said to have the powers and status of the legislature during the late Republic, or whether
it had usurped this role from the Tribal Assembly.
66. C.W. Keyes, Original Elements in Cicero’s Ideal Constitution, 41 AM. J. PHILOLOGY
309, 317 (1920).
67. DYCK, supra note 64, at 459.
68. Id.
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sections that follow this conclusion would be extraneous. This is not plausible,
considering the fact that, following the maxim, there are other proposals that
were of the highest importance to Cicero,69 given his personal stake in debates
related to emergency powers.
In the section of The Laws that follows directly after his use of the maxim,
Cicero describes his proposed procedure for the appointment of a dictator, who
is to be appointed by the Senate.70 Interestingly, his proposal departs from
previous precedents, where the Consuls appointed the dictator;71 this would
have denied the executive one of its traditional emergency powers, by instead
remitting these to the legislature. Crucially, Cicero also takes pains to
communicate that the dictator does not have arbitrary authority, by specifying
that the dictator would have only the powers of the Consuls.72 “Cicero is
careful to define the power accruing to the . . . dictator . . . with reference to the
regular ones [the ordinary magistrates].”73
Cicero limits the Consuls’ powers to those defined by the constitution,
since it is a fundamental principle for him that “the magistrate’s function is to
take charge and to issue directives which are right, beneficial, and in
accordance with the laws. As magistrates are subject to the laws, the people are
subject to the magistrates.”74 Dyck, who is properly attentive to Cicero’s
philosophical training and his key influences, traces this view directly to
Plato’s Laws.75 There, the Greek philosopher wrote that “the ministration of
the laws must be assigned . . . to that man who is most obedient to the laws
. . . . [W]herever the law is lord over the magistrates, and the magistrates are
servants to the law, there I descry salvation and all the blessings that the gods
bestow on States.”76
Cicero’s close attention to (and reverence of) Plato’s Laws also makes it
clear that the meaning of the maxim is found in its function as an imprecation
to the Consuls. In Plato’s work, the Athenian (who stands in for the author and
states his views) describes what it is that gives a law its status:
[W]e deny that laws are true laws unless they are enacted in the interest of the
common weal of the whole State. But where the laws are enacted in the

69. Id. at 427–28.
70. Id. at 15.
71. Id. at 461.
72. The benefit of a dictator stems from the fact that his executive acts cannot be vetoed by
the other Consul.
73. DYCK, supra note 64, at 462.
74. CICERO, supra note 60, at 150.
75. DYCK, supra note 64, at 432.
76. PLATO, LAWS bk. IV, at 291–92 (R.G. Bury trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1961).
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interest of a section, we call them “feudalities” rather than “polities”; and the
77
“justice” they ascribe to such laws is, we say, an empty name.

Accordingly, whenever one finds references to the welfare of the people in
Cicero, one should bear in mind that his primary concern was always the unity
of the orders that comprise the state,78 and understand that one must read in the
word “entire” before people. This clarifies that the original purpose of the
maxim was to express the hope that the Consuls would not use their office to
advance their own selfish interests, or those of their own class exclusively. The
contrary interpretation—that it grants emergency powers when the state is in
danger—has no evidence, and is for this reason, as Keyes noted, “universally
rejected as unthinkable.”79
B.

Cicero and Emergency Powers in the Late Republic

It is clear from a careful reading of The Laws that Cicero conceded that
there should be no implicit constitutional power for the executive to ignore the
laws when the state was in danger, and that the dictator, while unchecked by an
executive veto, was equally bound by the laws. Unfortunately, this does not
resolve the question of whether this power existed at any point during the late
Roman Republic. While Cicero’s writings do not provide definitive proof on
this question, evidence related to his political and legal career are quite
probative. One should begin with a consideration of a dictator’s powers under
the late republican constitution. This is because although the constitutional
provisions for the appointment of such a person existed, they are often wrongly
considered proof that this official would also have the power to operate
without the constraints of the laws. To that end, the discussion must turn to an
analysis of the procedures that were developed for dealing with public
emergencies during this period.
1.

The Scope of Dictatorial and Consular Powers During Public
Emergencies

By the time of Cicero’s birth, the procedure for the appointment of a
dictator had fallen into desuetude, having not been invoked since the end of the
Punic Wars.80 (This included the emergency precipitated by Hannibal’s
surprise attack on Rome.81) However, in 82 B.C., Lucius Cornelius Sulla was
appointed a dictator of an entirely new type, and given broad and

77. Id. at 291.
78. CICERO, supra note 60, at xv.
79. Keyes, supra note 66, at 317.
80. DAVID M. GWYNN, THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (2012).
81. Strictly speaking, in the time of Hannibal the Romans appointed a pro-Dictator (Quintus
Fabius Maximus) to respond to the invasion of Italy. THEODORE A. DODGE, HANNIBAL 314
(1891).
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unprecedented powers.82 In the wake of a civil war between the populist party
of Gaius Marius and the Roman oligarchy, the Senate appointed Sulla a
“[d]ictator for making laws and settling the constitution.”83 After using these
unprecedented powers to ruthlessly suppress all opposition, Sulla set up a new
constitutional order, which survived until the end of the Roman Republic.84
This new regime did not include any procedure for the appointment of
dictators, and accordingly none were appointed until Caesar was given a
similarly large mandate “to set the State in order,”85 something which was
done “[d]espite odious memories of Sulla”86 and which was—to say the
least—constitutionally problematic. Accordingly, at the time that Cicero was
writing, it is unclear whether or not a procedure for the appointment of a
dictator existed at all. Instead, during the period between Sulla and Caesar’s
reforms, the procedure for dealing with emergencies was known as the senatus
consultum ultimum.87 This is “[a] declaration of emergency by the Senate,
which was generally supposed to authorize the magistrates [Consuls] to use
any means against the public enemies; the right of appeal was temporarily
suspended.”88
This definition is largely correct, but must be limited to what it actually
states, not what it might be thought to imply. The declaration did authorize the
Consuls to take emergency measures against public enemies, and the right to
appeal was suspended (something which was eminently reasonable, since
appeal involved the massing of the comitia centuriata, which consisted of all
citizens89), but the view that this authorized any and all methods of dealing
with disorder is incorrect. It is obvious that the right to appeal would not need
to be abolished if suspects did not have the right to a trial after being captured.
Closer inspection of the trials related to abuses of emergency powers
reveals that there were two laws that guaranteed a Roman citizen’s right to a
trial that could not be overridden by a senatorial decree.90 This conclusion
seems to follow naturally, since these laws had been passed by the Tribal
Assembly they could not be overridden by senatus consulta, which could not

82. GWYNN, supra note 80, at 101, 104.
83. THOMAS M. TAYLOR, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF ROME 294
(Gaunt, Inc. reprint 1997).
84. ARTHUR KEAVENEY, SULLA: THE LAST REPUBLICAN 214–23 (1982).
85. RONALD SYME, THE ROMAN REVOLUTION 52 (1967).
86. Id.
87. Bula Melissa Gardner, Development of the Senatus Consultum Ultimum 33–56 (1929)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin) (on file with University of WisconsinMadison Libraries).
88. R.E. SMITH, THE FAILURE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 85 n.1 (1955).
89. This was accomplished by the interdiction of fire and water outside of a specified
location for internal exile, namely an island or some far-flung province.
90. See infra Part II.B.3.
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override a law.91 After these state trials, it was reasserted over the objections of
Cicero and the optimates that the Senate could not abolish the right to trial by
passing a consultum ultimum.92 This undoubtedly led Cicero to abandon his
drive for stronger emergency powers, as evidenced by his more modest
proposals in The Laws.93
2.

The Trial of Rabirius Reveals the Scope of Roman Emergency Powers

One of the most sensational trials in Roman history—involving both
Cicero and Julius Caesar—was the case brought against the Senator Gaius
Rabirius for personally murdering Lucius Appuleius Saturninus in 100 B.C.94
Since the killing occurred during a state of emergency declared with a senatus
consultum ultimum,95 this trial sheds considerable light on the late republican
constitution. The verdict contradicts the unfortunate modern misinterpretation
of salus populi supreme lex est—that a threat to the state would allow the
executive to take any action necessary to protect the existing constitutional
order.
In fact, the trial demonstrates that such a broad principle was not part of
the republican constitution as eminent classicists have concluded:
[N]either in theory nor in fact did it [the consultum ultimum] add to the legal
powers which they [the Consuls] already had. It conferred on them no new
authority nor did it even purport to remove any of the restrictions which were
imposed by statute on the use of their imperium [i.e., power to punish
96
according to law].

The facts underlying the trial are as follows. Saturninus, a tribune of the
plebeians, was declared an enemy of the people by the Senate.97 After
Saturninus fled to the Capitol, Marius captured Saturninus and imprisoned him
in the Senate house.98 Marius had intended to put him on trial, but the more
oligarchic members of his forces instead climbed onto the roof of the Curia
Hostilia, pried off its roof tiles, and used them to stone Saturninus and the
other prisoners;99 witnesses would later testify that Rabirius had thrown the

91. See ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC: ADDRESSES ON THE
HISTORY OF ROMAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, S. DOC. NO. 103–23, at 181 (2d Sess. 1995).
92. See infra Part II.B.3.
93. CICERO, supra note 66, at 323.
94. JOHN WILLIAMS, THE LIFE OF JULIUS CAESAR 67 (1854).
95. Gardner, supra note 87, at 50–54.
96. TH. N. MITCHELL, Cicero and the Senatus Consultum Ultimum, 20 HISTORIA:
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ALTE GESCHICHTE 47, 49 (1971).
97. Id. at 52.
98. Id.
99. EVERITT, supra note 53, at 19.
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fatal tile and that he had carried Saturninus’s head around with him
afterwards.100
Thirty-seven years had passed since the murder and the defendant had
prospered within the Roman oligarchy, attaining senatorial rank and great
wealth.101 Caesar wanted to shame the oligarchic party for failing to prosecute
an obvious and scandalous crime.102 Accordingly, Rabirius was not charged
merely with assassination (sicariis), or high treason (perduello), but with
scandalous immorality.103 “It was calculated to rally the popular party round
the ‘unicum libertatis praesidium’ [the defense of the unparalleled palladium
of Roman liberties] . . . it sounded a significant note of warning, clearly not
lost upon Cicero, against careless application of martial law by senate or
consuls, or failure to punish regrettable or illegal incidents.”104
Rabirius was convicted at trial, but rather than exiling himself to avoid
execution,105 he exercised his right of provocatio, that is, the right to appeal to
the people of Rome through the assembly known as the comitia centuriata.106
Cicero decided to use his defense of Rabirius at this appeal de novo to argue
for a broad reading of the extraordinary powers granted by the consultum
ultimum.107 In an audacious attempt to rewrite the constitution of the republic,
Cicero argued that the consultum gave anyone enforcing it the power to kill a
prisoner without trial:
If you admit that Rabirius had the right to take up arms, you must admit that he
had the right to kill Saturninus . . . . If Rabirius has committed a capital crime
in taking up arms against Saturninus, what is to be said of all those noble
patriots who did the same . . . ? There is not a loyal citizen in Rome to-day,
108
who is not in the name of Rabirius the subject of a capital charge.

The argument was clearly unavailing and numerous classicists have averred
that Rabirius was about to be convicted by the comitia centuriata.109 Cassius
Dio concluded that “Rabirius would certainly have been condemned but for the
intervention of [the Praetor Quintus Caecilius] Metellus [Celer].”110 Metellus

100. Id.
101. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, PRO RABIRIO POSTUMO 18–19 (Mary Siani-Davies trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2001). Gaius Rabirius’s wealth is evident from the fact that he is the adoptive
father of Gaius Rabirius Postumo, whose wealth was legendary. Id.
102. ERNEST GEORGE HARDY, SOME PROBLEMS IN ROMAN HISTORY 109 (1924).
103. Id. at 118.
104. Id. at 109–10.
105. A right created by the lex Porcia of 195 B.C.
106. Established by the lex Valeria of 299 B.C.
107. HARDY, supra note 102, at 108.
108. Id. (quoting Cicero’s speech, Pro Rabirio).
109. See, e.g., HARDY, supra note 102, at 121; Evan T. Sage, The Senatus Consultum
Ultimum, 13 CLASSICAL WEEKLY 185, 187 (1920).
110. HARDY, supra note 102, at 124.
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hauled down the red flag flying over the guard-post on the Janiculum hill,
which by custom required the comitia to disperse and for the dismissal with
prejudice of all pending cases.111 As Sage notes, “By this ruse Rabirius
escaped conviction.”112 This seems to be clear evidence that the argument that
an emergency decree allowed Consuls to execute rebels without trial was
considered extraconstitutional and unacceptable.
3.

The Constitutional Background to Cicero’s Failed Attempt at Legal
Reform

To understand why Cicero’s argument was unacceptable to the Romans,
one must explore the state of civil liberties and due process in the late
republican period and how it created a palladium of liberties that were held in
high esteem by the populace. Owing to periods of struggle between the various
social classes, members of Rome’s lower orders had demanded a manifold of
procedural safeguards.113
These laws included the lex Valeria, which required granting an appeal to
the people after any conviction on a capital charge.114 One of these laws
effectively converted death sentences into internal exile, since it allowed the
defendant to flee before sentence would be passed.115 The leges Porciae
explicitly provided for the trial and punishment of magistrates who attempted
to circumvent the Valerian laws,116 and the lex Sempronia ne quis iudicio
circumveniatur forbade the creation of special courts or judicial commissions,
even during periods of turmoil or after emergency decrees were passed.117
These laws were so prized that their violation was thought to be not only
wrong, but also sacrilegious.118 This is evident from the fact that Caesar was
able to revive a special procedure involving duumviri perduellionis for the
prosecution of Rabirius, which was justified by reference to the fact that the
murder was so scandalous that it angered the gods.119

111. Id. at 123. The lowering of the flag dispersed the assembly since it had once indicated
that an attack from the Etruscans (who had ceased to become an adversary long ago after their
complete assimilation into the republic) was imminent.
112. Sage, supra note 109, at 187.
113. DENTON J. SNIDER, EUROPEAN HISTORY: CHIEFLY ANCIENT IN ITS PROCESSES 461
(1908).
114. GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF ROME 209 n.48 (2007).
115. GORDON P. KELLY, A HISTORY OF EXILE IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 20–28 (2006).
116. MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 114, at 209 n.48.
117. N. J. Miners, The Lex Sempronia Ne Quis Iudicio Circumveniatur, 8 CLASSICAL Q. 241,
241 (1958) (citing THEODOR MOMMSEN, HISTORY OF ROME 355 (Dickson trans., 1894)).
118. ANDREW LINTOTT, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 150–51 (1999).
119. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 50 (W. D. Halls trans.,
1984).
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There is no inherent tension between the principles of due process
embodied in these laws and the consulta ultimum when the powers these
decrees granted to the Consuls are properly understood. The law that allowed
for these emergency measures to be passed by the Senate was understood to
authorize only action “in strict conformity . . . [to what had been done by
Lucius] Opimius,”120 who had led the forces of order in the wake of the death
of the populist Gaius Graccus.121 It had been held that “Opimius did not violate
the lex Sempronia when he killed Gracchus iniussu populi [without the
command of the people speaking the comitia centuriata], because the latter
was . . . an open enemy under arms.”122 Accordingly, as Hardy noted:
If, therefore, there was a state of war in the city, and riotous citizens with arms
in their hands threatened the safety of the state, the senate was justified in
passing its decree . . . . The consuls were then justified in “calling the people to
arms”, putting themselves at its head, and carrying into effect the state of war.
It followed that all riotous citizens who were killed by members of this armed
force acting under the consuls’ order, lost their lives as overt enemies of the
state—perduelles [traitors]—so that neither the Sempronian law requiring trial
by the people, nor the Porcian law requiring appeal, was applicable to the
123
case.

Hardy argues that this was the common understanding of the scope of the
powers conferred by the consulta.124 The popular rejection of Cicero’s theory
at the conclusion of Rabirius’s trial—that the decree authorized any action in
defense of the state—reveals that a consultum did not allow every
constitutional provision to be broken in defense of the state, and also reveals
the limitations of the precedent set by the approval of Opimius’s acts. One
must note that “Saturninus on surrendering and being made prisoner had
ceased to be an open perduellis in arms against the State, whose safety
demanded his instant death,” and that accordingly Rabirius had been found
guilty for murdering him.125 This was only possible if the Roman people
understood that the Senate’s decree did not absolve anyone acting pursuant to
its authorization to break the law, but only to kill rebels “with arms in their
hands” in open battle.126 As the next subsection will demonstrate, even Cicero
needed to accept that this was the correct interpretation later that year when the
Senate called upon him personally to take the field against rebels, pursuant to a
consultum ultimum.
120. HARDY, supra note 102, at 102.
121. ERIK HILDINGER, SWORDS AGAINST THE SENATE 52–57 (2002).
122. E. G. Hardy, The Catilinarian Conspiracy in its Context: A Re-Study of the Evidence, 7
J. ROMAN STUD. 153, 212 (1917).
123. HARDY, supra note 102, at 102–03.
124. Id. at 103.
125. Id. at 107.
126. Id. at 103.
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The Catilinarian Conspiracy Reveals a Consultum Ultimum’s
Limitations

In 63 B.C., another populist conspiracy to overthrow the republic was
alleged.127 Catiline was said to have been plotting along with a rebel army in
Etruria to seize the city.128 Cicero, by then Consul, denounced Catiline in a
series of famous orations even before hard evidence came into his hands.129 In
these blistering speeches, he “constantly reiterate[ed]” that “Catiline and his
associates were hostes [enemies of the state].”130 Cicero obtained what
appeared to be solid proof of the conspiracy from Fabius Sanga.131
Subsequently, Catiline’s second-in-command, the praetor Publius Cornelius
Lentulus and his associates were seized by Cicero’s men.132 By this point
Cicero had secured the consultum ultimum from the Senate, which authorized
him to use lethal force against armed enemies.133
Following the precedent set in Rabirius’s trial, Cicero should have turned
Lentulus over to the magistrates. After a verdict, Lentulus would have had the
right to choose either exile or appeal that sentence to the people. If Cicero
really believed that this was not the correct interpretation of the law, he could
have followed Rabirius’s example and simply killed his prisoners. Realizing
that this second choice was too dangerous, Cicero instead attempted to expand
the powers granted under the emergency decree to abrogate the procedural
protections of the Porcian and Valerian laws, but in a novel way. His solution
was to put the question to the Senate, which he argued was a duly empowered
court of justice.134
Cicero suggested that the Senate had a right to convict and sentence
Lentulus and his associates rather than to execute them pursuant to his own
consular power after the decree, despite the urgings of other members of the
oligarchic party.135 He “asserted that all the leges de provocatione [the Porcian

127. See LESTER HUTCHINSON, THE CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE 9 (1966).
128. Id. at 44.
129. THE ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO (C. D. Yonge trans., George Bell & Sons
1879).
130. George Willis Botsford, On the Legality of the Trial and Condemnation of the
Catilinarian Conspirators, 6 CLASSICAL WEEKLY 130, 131 (1913).
131. Elizabeth Deniaux, Patronage, the Exchange of Favors, and Social Harmony, in A
COMPANION TO THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 401, 411 (Nathan Rosenstein & Robert Morstein-Marx
eds., 2010).
132. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 239 (Timothy Venning ed., 2011). Accord
SALLUST, THE CATILINE AND JUGURTHA 40–41 (Alfred W. Pollard trans., 1882).
133. VELLEIUS PATERCULUS, THE ROMAN HISTORY 51–52 & n.105 (J. C. Yardley &
Anthony A. Barrett trans., 2011).
134. 4 THE ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 27 (C. D. Yonge trans., George Bell &
Sons 1879).
135. EVERITT, supra note 53, at 107–08.
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law requiring appeals to the people of capital sentences] were for the
protection of the citizens only, and that those who attempted flagrantly to
overthrow the republic ceased, by that very act, to be citizens, and were
accordingly no longer under the protection of the laws.”136 However, Cicero
proved “unwilling to take upon himself the responsibility of deciding their [the
prisoners’] fate[s], even though backed by the consultum ultimum. He has
determined that the [S]enate is to be the court for the trial of the case of these
conspirators.”137 By suggesting the Senate try Lentulus, Cicero was accepting
that the conspirators retained the benefit of the laws.138 This was tacit
acceptance of the holding in Rabirius’s case.
If the people accepted Cicero’s proposition that the Senate was a duly
constituted court, it would also protect him from the charge that he was
violating the Sempronian law, which “forb[ade] the appointment of
extraordinary judicial commissions with power to impose a capital
sentence.”139 Unfortunately for Cicero, this interpretation of the Sempronian
law was untenable, and would be vigorously rejected by Julius Caesar in a
speech before the Senate.140 Hardy highlights Caesar’s “ignoring of Cicero’s
precedents [for a trial before the Senate], and the insistence that a novum
exemplum is involved . . . . [and making a] veiled warning [of illegality]
contained in the reference to the lex Porcia.”141
After Cato the Younger intervened in the debate and bolstered his resolve,
Cicero ordered that Lentulus and the other prisoners be strangled in their
cells.142 This reckless action led to serious consequences. The Tribune of the
Plebeians moved against Cicero, forbidding Cicero from addressing the people
on the grounds “that he had put Roman citizens to death untried.”143 Hardy
agrees with this conclusion: “It was obviously no adequate defence to say that
the senate had passed its last decree [consultum ultimum]. . . . That in itself was
neither an order nor even a permission to break a fundamental law.”144 This
also follows from Rabirius’s trial.
Later, Publius Clodius Pulcher responded to this extrajudicial execution by
introducing a plebiscite to the Plebian Council, which subsequently became a

136. Botsford, supra note 130, at 131.
137. Id.
138. Id. (“Cicero accordingly applies the term iudicare to the action of the [S]enate”).
139. Miners, supra note 117, at 241; see also HARDY, supra note 102, at 211–12.
140. SALLUST, CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE AND THE JURGURTHINE WAR 50 (John Selby
Watson trans., Aeterna 2011).
141. HARDY, supra note 102, at 214.
142. Id. at 217–18.
143. Botsford, supra note 130, at 131.
144. HARDY, supra note 102, at 219.
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law.145 The lex Clodia de civibus romanis interemptis authorized prosecutions
of any official who executed a Roman citizen without trial.146 Cicero believed
that it was directed at him personally, so he went into voluntary exile before he
could be charged.147 As Botsford notes, there was nothing novel about this law,
it was simply a recognition that the fundamental laws were not suspended by
the consultum ultimum: “Notwithstanding Cicero’s repeated denunciations of
the unconstitutionality of the latter act [the Clodian law], the tribunician
assembly, in passing it, kept itself strictly within the limits of precedent.”148
Cicero never really recovered from the stain of these executions.149
Instead, he retreated into literary affairs, writing his best-known works.150 As
described in subsection one above, in The Laws, one can see that he decisively
rejected the position of the extremists within the oligarchic party that the salus
populi allowed the Consuls to execute citizens without trial or appeal, even
after a declaration of a public emergency. Additionally, these arguments were
decisively rejected by the people of Rome when they prepared to sentence
Rabirius and when they passed the Clodian law. Accordingly, one can
conclude that there is simply no support for the proposition that the republican
constitution contained a meta-principle that empowered the executive branch
to ignore the principles of due process when defending the welfare of the
people.
III. THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION AND MEDIEVAL RULE OF LAW
One might argue that the real legacy of the Roman law stems not from the
comparatively brief Late Republican Period but rather from the Imperial
Period, which was not only considerably longer but gave birth to the legal
codes that would have the greatest influence on the formation of the Western
legal tradition—in particular the Corpus Iuris Civilis.151 Such an observer
might also argue that even if the maxim of salus populi suprema lex est was
not embedded into the republican constitution, it may have been a part of the
imperial constitution, as the emperor must have had the power to act whenever
he thought it was necessary to preserve the public welfare. As will be shown
below, this supposition has no support.

145. ERICH S. GRUEN, THE LAST GENERATION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 244–45 & n.142
(1974).
146. Id. at 245.
147. KELLY, supra note 115, at 225–28.
148. Botsford, supra note 130, at 131–32.
149. Id. at 131.
150. EVERITT, supra note 53, at 251–54.
151. ELLEN GOODMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 221–22 (1995);
1–3 CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger eds., 1954).
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The popular understanding of the power of the emperor is that it was
unbounded.152 This ignores the fact that the Roman citizenry justified their
opposition to emperors by arguing that they did not rule in accordance with the
laws.153 The distinction between a king (or an emperor) and a tyrant was
already a popular topos in antiquity,154 and thus it was essential for the
imperial constitution to define legal boundaries for the exercise of the
emperor’s powers. Accordingly, “[t]he emperor was on principle bound by the
law,” and “[t]his classical law remained in force until A.D. 533,”155 when the
Digest became the law of the empire.156 Paulus is perfectly clear on this
point:157 “Testamentum, in quo imperator heres scriptus est, inofficiosum argui
potest: eum enim qui leges facit pari maiestate legibus obtemperare
convenit.”158 Ulpian expressed the same opinion.159
Unfortunately, this understanding has been clouded by the erroneous belief
that Ulpian also advanced very strong opinions to the contrary. He has been
associated with the opinion that “[t]he emperor is not bound by statutes,”160
and second, that “[a] decision given by the emperor has the force of a
statute.”161 This is assumed to be correct since the Digest asserts that these
were his views. However, to understand imperial constitutional theory
correctly, one must pay much closer attention to both the nature of this code
and the society that produced it.

152. See, e.g., 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 423
(Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 1993) (1776) (explaining the immense power that the emperor had over the
Roman world).
153. See MICHAEL MAAS, READINGS IN LATE ANTIQUITY: A SOURCEBOOK 2, 5–6, 10–11
(Routledge 2d ed. 2010) (showing that although the emperors had great power, many times
opposition against them was justified because of the abuse of that power). Accord Benjamin
Kelly, Riot Control and Imperial Ideology in the Roman Empire, 61 PHOENIX 150, 151, 156, 162,
165 (2007) (showing Roman opposition to the emperor’s power and authority).
154. Fritz Schulz, Bracton on Kingship, 60 ENG. HIST. REV. 136, 151 (1945).
155. Id. at 156.
156. GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF ROMAN
LAW 385–86 (2003).
157. Julius Paulus Prudentissimus, the last and most authoritative of the Roman jurists.
158. PAULI SENTENTIAE 4.5.3, available at http://ancientrome.ru/ius/library/paul/paul4.htm.
See also Schulz, supra note 154, at 160.
159. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 176 (Alan Watson ed. & trans., Univ. of Pa. Press rev. ed.
1998).
160. Id. at 13.
161. Id. at 14.
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Understanding That the Corpus Iuris Civilis Is Not an Accurate Reflection
of Even the Late Imperial Constitution

The Digest was promulgated in 534, more than a century after the fall of
the West.162 It was commissioned by Justinian to serve as the law of the
Eastern Roman Empire.163 One must also remember that the East had always
been culturally different, as it was more influenced by the Hellenistic
civilization that it had displaced than by the mos maiorum particular to
Rome.164 The code was compiled by Tribonian after centuries of cultural and
political divergence from Rome, and it was not an entirely straightforward
compilation of traditional Roman legal principles.165
Fritz Schulz has conclusively demonstrated that the above two statements,
attributed to Ulpian in the Digest, are not authentic. He noted that during
Ulpian’s era, the emperors derived their authority from the lex de imperio
Vespansiani,166 which, as its name indicates, invests the emperor with the
imperium of a Roman magistrate.167 As for the first assertion, that the emperor
was not bound by the laws, Schulz demonstrated that Ulpian had actually said
only that he was not bound by one law—the caduca ex lege Papia,168 which
pertained to inheritance rights (the emperor had been given a special
dispensation from this law by statute).169 As for the second statement, that
whatever pleased the ruler had the force of law, Schulz presented textual
evidence that shows that Ulpian had stated merely that the emperor had a
“strictly limited power” to enact certain laws pursuant to the Vespasian
imperial law (analogous to the President’s power to promulgate executive
orders).170
As the emperor was required to follow the laws, no argument can be made
for the proposition that the maxim at issue was any stronger in the empire than
in the republic.171 However, the inclusion of these views attributed to Ulpian in
162. Alan Watson, Preface to the Original Edition of THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note
159.
163. See JAMES ALLAN EVANS, THE EMPEROR JUSTINIAN AND THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE 24–
25 (2005) (showing that the Digest was promulgated to serve as law and subsequently fulfilled
this purpose).
164. See Sten Ebbsen, Greek-Latin Philosophical Interaction, in BYZANTINE PHILOSOPHY
AND ITS ANCIENT SOURCES 15, 15–18, 21–22, 25 (Katerina Ierodiakonou ed., Oxford Univ. Press
2002) (showing the Hellenistic influence even when under Roman rule).
165. MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 156, at 384, 388–89.
166. Schulz, supra note 154, at 154.
167. See P. A. Brunt, Lex de Imperio Vespasiani, 67 J. ROMAN STUD. 95, 100, 104 (1977)
(showing the power and authority conveyed in the lex de imperio Vespansiani).
168. Schulz, supra note 154, at 158.
169. Id. at 156.
170. Id. at 154.
171. This Article will not discuss the interrex’s powers of justiciam, since it cannot be said
that the interrex was an executive stricto sensu.
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the Digest raises the question of whether or not a Byzantine emperor might
have had emergency powers to ignore the laws when acting for the public
welfare, and if so, whether this constitutional principle was transmitted via the
Corpus to the jurists of the Middle Ages.
B.

The Structure of Byzantine Imperial Power

When Tribonian and his collaborators wrenched these citations out of
context, they were attempting to bring the Roman theory of imperium (which
was a legal construct) together with Hellenistic ideas about the power of the
king, namely that he is a law unto himself. These eastern ideas were
“[contrary] to the ideas of the Augustan principate,”172 which also undergirded
those of the Dominate, by way of the Vespasian imperial law.173 Accordingly,
they were “not the Roman constitutional law of the third century . . . [which]
was not superseded earlier than Justinian.”174 These views, promulgated in a
more explicit and forceful form in Justinian’s New Laws, were the foundation
not of the Roman, but rather the Byzantine theory of imperial powers, and
“[b]y this passage the Hellenistic conception of the emperor as the animated
law was handed down to the middle ages.”175
It is important to note that the Byzantine emperors did not obtain absolute
power despite the statements from the novels referenced above, as will be
demonstrated here. There was a clear tension in its theory of the emperor’s
powers owing to the inclusion of another passage derived from a declaration of
Theodosius and Valentinian included in the Digest: this law, which is known
as Digna Vox, would prove to be of singular importance to both Byzantine and
medieval conceptions of a ruler’s power, serving as “a touchstone for juristic
discussions of the prince’s obligations to respect cause and norms.”176 It holds
that:
For a sovereign to acknowledge himself bound by the laws is a statement
befitting the majesty of a ruler, and, therefore, our authority depends upon the
authority [of] law. And for a sovereign to submit himself to the laws, is in fact
a greater thing than imperial power. And by the announcement of the present
177
edict we show what we do not permit ourselves to do.

172. Schulz, supra note 154, at 157.
173. Brunt, supra note 167, at 101, 105, 107, 109, 113–14 (showing the strengthened power
of the emperor through the Vespasian imperial law).
174. Schulz, supra note 154, at 158.
175. Id. at 160.
176. KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW, 1200–1600, at 63 (1993).
177. ANNOTATED JUSTINIAN CODE 1.14.4 (Timothy Kearley ed., Fred H. Blume trans.,
2008), available at http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/_files/docs/code-revisions/book
1rev-copy/book%201-14rev.pdf.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

380

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:355

Here, it is evident that even an emperor who derives some of his
legitimacy from Hellenistic ideas about kingship must be aware that he still
cannot govern in the manner of a tyrant. However, given that an emperor,
unlike a consul, cannot be prosecuted or impeached, how can he be said to be
subject to the laws? The solution was for the sovereign to bind himself. Under
“Justinian’s Corpus iuris the emperor was . . . legally not subjected to the law.
Morally, however, he was regarded as under an obligation to observe it: a
number of pre-Justinian texts containing this principle were inserted in the
Corpus iuris.”178 Hence, it cannot be said that the Byzantine emperor could
dispense with the laws when the public welfare required it. This principle was
reaffirmed and transmitted.
C. The Transmission of Byzantine Ideas About Imperium to the Middle Ages
When discussing the reception of the Roman law in the Middle Ages, one
must bear in mind that although the Corpus Iuris Civilis formed a significant
part of the substrate of medieval law, it was not the sole source of early
medieval ideas about kingship.179 Outside of a Hellenistic cultural context,
Greek ideas had considerably less appeal. The idea that a king would be above
the law was alien to the Germanic tribes that occupied what had been the
Western Roman Empire, where rulers obtained their powers pursuant to
complex laws of succession that involved popular consent.180 Thus, it is not
surprising that their hybrid systems of law (for example, the Lex
Burgundiorum and Isidore of Seville’s Lex Visigothorum Reccesvindiana)
were hostile to absolute powers.181 Under Isidore’s code, the king is put on a
par with the people and is therefore not only morally but also “legally bound to
observe the law.”182 This weaker conception of royal powers was transmitted
to England, where it figures prominently in the work of John of Salisbury and
Bracton.183
Medieval theorists conceptualizing the tension between the king’s duty to
observe the laws and to protect the people noted that Aquinas had not resolved
the issue perfectly.184 The theologian had left open the door to the argument

178. Schulz, supra note 154, at 163.
179. See Ian N. Wood, Gentes, Kings and Kingdoms—The Emergence of States: The
Kingdom of the Gibichungs, in 13 REGNA AND GENTES 243, 243–70 (Hans-Werner Goetz et al.
eds., 2003).
180. Id.
181. See Katherine Fischer Drew, The Barbarian Kings as Lawgivers and Judges, in LIFE
AND THOUGHT IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 7, 7–29 (Robert S. Hoyt ed., 1967).
182. Schulz, supra note 154, at 163.
183. Id. at 168.
184. See THOMAS AQUINAS, OF THE NATURAL LAW, reprinted in THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 49–51 (Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953)
(discussing Quare 42, reply to Objection 3). See also Schulz, supra note 154, at 165.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

IS AN INVIOLABLE CONSTITUTION A SUICIDE PACT?

381

that a medieval king, in protecting the common good, is not bound (either
legally, in classical Roman practice, or morally, according to Byzantine
precedent) by the laws when emergencies require extra-legal action.
This question was resolved differently across Europe, but the clearest
response to this thorny question in medieval legal theory can be found in
English jurisprudence. Bracton was “a serious student of Roman law” who
“wished to point out that St. Isidore’s doctrine was in conformity to Roman
law. . . . In truth Bracton’s opinion was indubitably that the king was legally
bound by the law . . . .”185 Bracton, like other “Romanistic outsiders” (such as
Franciscus Accursius) used arguments derived from Ulpian’s Edicts when
concluding that “the law is above the king.”186 He also cited the Digna Vox as
evidence on this point, relying upon the literal wording of the original text.187
Bracton apparently translated Theodosian and Valentinian’s order as “[t]he
emperors declare that henceforth the emperor is legally bound by the law.”188
Relying upon Azo, Bracton also concluded that since the law created the king,
he must make a tribute in return by obeying the laws.189
One should also note that Bracton’s comments might have been given an
even stronger reading than he had intended owing to the realities of English
politics. (Interpolations into text “D” of Bracton argue that “[i]f the king is
regardless of law then the counts and barons must interfere” which justifies
placing the king underneath a council of his nobles of the type originally
contemplated by the original Magna Carta’s clause 61.)190 Bracton’s English
reading of Roman law inclined itself against absolutism, but even civilians in
such bastions of Roman law had resisted the more absolutist interpretations of
the Corpus.
The key problem was “when and under what circumstances could the
prince set aside, distort, or ignore the rules of the legal system(s) that he was
normally obligated to preserve and uphold?”191 Pennington concluded that
despite the reception of the quasi-absolutist misreadings of Ulpian, “[J]urists
besieged the fortress of absolute power by investing it with judicial norms,
natural law, reason, custom, privilege, obligations, in effect, the ‘constitution’
of the realm.”192 To determine whether under these constitutional orders the
king possessed emergency powers of the type that would allow us to conclude
that the maxim at issue here had the status of a constitutional or meta185. Schulz, supra note 154, at 165.
186. Id. at 166 (citing GLÜCK, 1 AUSFÜHRLICHE ERLÄUTERUNG DER PANDECTEN § 43, at
280 (1797)).
187. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 40 n.124 (2010).
188. Schulz, supra note 154, at 168.
189. Id. at 168.
190. Id. at 174.
191. PENNINGTON, supra note 176, at 2–3.
192. Id. at 76.
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constitutional principle one must consider whether the rights created by these
constitutions were absolute, in a manner that prevented their abridgment even
during emergencies.
IV. MEDIEVAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CREATION OF DUE PROCESS
During the late Middle Ages, principles of due process emerged that
prevented rulers from using emergency measures against subjects that did not
comply with emerging norms of judicial procedure. Although many rulers
attempted to create and invoke exceptions where the public welfare was at
stake, medieval jurists rejected their arguments. Accordingly, it became clear
that the rulers were legally bound to observe these limits, or face the allegation
of tyranny and resistance from their subjects that would be viewed as
justifiable.
These developments can be found in both England and continental Europe.
On the continent, the jurisprudence of the Holy Roman Empire and the papal
rescripts defined constitutional limits on emergency powers; in England, the
boundaries of executive power were decisively shaped by the Magna Carta and
the statutes that bolstered its status as a fundamental law. Other statutes closed
any loopholes that might have allowed for the development of royal power to
protect the public when the state was allegedly in crisis.
A.

Checks on Imperial Authority in the Law of the Holy Roman Empire

Before the thirteenth century, continental rulers had sometimes asserted
that they had a right to abrogate what modern observers would consider due
process when they deemed it necessary. These views were not without some
scholarly support, especially when the ruler in question was the Pope.
Hostiensis, who promulgated an absolutist theory of the Pope’s powers,193
cited Roman law in support of his argument that since criminal procedure was
merely a feature of the positive law—not part of the natural law—the entire
trial could be dispensed with when the defendant’s crimes were notorious.194
Had this principle been accepted within the emerging medieval constitutional
order, one could conclude that early medieval jurisprudence had indeed
contained a constitutional metaprinciple that salus populi suprema lex est.
However, the argument that the right to a trial was merely a feature of the
positive law195 was rejected in the second half of the thirteenth century by

193. See Francis Oakley, The Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth- and
Seventeenth-Century Theology, 59 J. HIST. IDEAS 437, 442 (1998).
194. PENNINGTON, supra note 176, at 147.
195. See Brian Tierney, “The Prince is Not Bound by the Laws.” Accursius and the Origins of
the Modern State, 5 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 378, 382 (1963).
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jurists who “began to argue that the ordo iudicarius (the normal trial
procedure) was not derived from civil law, but from natural law.”196
Stephen of Tournai described the ordo iudicarius in this manner:
The defendant shall be summoned before his own judge and be
legitimately called by three edicts or one peremptory edict. He must be
permitted to have legitimate delays. The accusation must be formally presented
in writing. Legitimate witnesses must be produced. A decision may only be
197
rendered only after someone has been convicted or confessed.

Even before these jurists made it clear that no emergency could authorize a
ruler to dispense with the requirement of a trial, Pope Innocent III had
“maintained that a prince could not abolish the judicial process or ignore an
action because he was bound by natural law to render justice.”198 Hostiensis,
when coming to the opposite conclusion, had “left out the crucial passage . . .
[and] shortened Innocent’s comments almost to the point of
incomprehensibility.”199 Accordingly, “although [Hostiensis] concurred with
Innocent that the pope should never pervert the ordo iudicarius and was
always obligated to render justice . . . Hostiensis emphasized the occasions
when the pope could subvert due process. ”200
Perhaps due to his misuse of Innocent’s arguments, Hostiensis’s opinion
was not adopted by subsequent jurists, who concurred with Innocent on
different grounds. Citing Roman precedent, Odofredis de Denariis argued that
since the emperor could never take away that which belonged to a person
without legal process, nor could any ruler take away the right to legal
process.201 Guido of Suzzara agreed, and following Accursius202 argued that a
statute that purported to do so would be void.203 Through the works of
anonymous commentators and Guido’s student, Jacobus de Arena (who later
taught at Bologna, Padua, and Toulouse), this view became widely
influential.204
In the jurisprudence of the early fourteenth century, one can observe signs
that these formative constitutionalist ideas about the rule of law were spreading
across Europe and being used to explicitly rule out exceptions to the
requirements of due process. Johannes Monachus undercut the idea that the
procedural norms could be dispensed with even when the crime was notorious.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

PENNINGTON, supra note 176, at 148–49.
Id. at 143 (citation omitted).
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 150–51.
PENNINGTON, supra note 176, at 151.
Tierney, supra note 195, at 398.
PENNINGTON, supra note 176, at 94, 155.
Id. at 155.
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He concluded in his commentary on Pope Boniface VIII’s Rem Non Novam
that not even the Pope—who had the most power of all rulers to ignore
positive laws—could proceed against a defendant who had not been served
with a summons, even when the crime was notorious.205 In those
circumstances, “[T]he judge may proceed in a summary fashion in some parts
of the process, but the summons and [public] judgment must be observed.”206
Guilielmus Durantis agreed: “[T]hose accused of notorious crimes should have
a proper trial.”207
This principle became entrenched in the still-developing ius commune
during the fourteenth century and is prominent in the juristic commentary on
the struggle between the Holy Roman Emperor Henry VII and King Robert of
Naples. In 1312, Henry decided to bring charges of treason against Robert,
alleging that his vassal was guilty of treason for having stirred up resistance to
imperial rule over traditionally Guelph cities in northern Italy.208 Henry
summoned Robert to answer the charges, but he claimed that the summons
could not be delivered personally due to the danger of bandits on the roads.209
Henry then declared that he still had the power to proceed against Robert
under these circumstances. In a decree entitled Ad Reprimendum, he “decreed
that whoever committed the crime of treason . . . could be condemned in
absentia in summary proceedings.”210 Henry justified his condemnation of
Robert as follows: “Robert’s crimes were public and notorious . . . . Robert did
not appear for the hearing, and having heard and recorded the testimony of
witnesses, we condemned him in an interlocutory judgment. We now make this
judgment [that Robert be beheaded and his lands confiscated] definitive.”211
Henry’s assertions of his own powers conflicted with jurisprudence stating that
rulers had no power to dispense with summons. The jurists of his day did not
take kindly to his assertions.
Commentaries on this dispute establish that the prevailing legal opinion
was solidly against Henry: “The tracts defending Robert and the papacy far
outnumber those supporting Henry VII.”212 Following Monachus, Oldradus de
Ponte argued in his consilia that a judgment rendered without giving the
defendant a chance to defend himself was invalid: “[T]he prince could not
deny a subject the right to due process because it was grounded in natural

205. Kenneth Pennington, Sovereignty and Rights in Medieval and Early Modern
Jurisprudence: Law and Norms Without a State, in RETHINKING THE STATE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALISATION 117, 123 (Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven & James Turner eds., 2003).
206. PENNINGTON, supra note 176, at 161–62.
207. Id. at 163.
208. Id. at 165–66, 169.
209. Id. at 169.
210. Id. at 170.
211. PENNINGTON, supra note 176, at 170.
212. Id. at 175.
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law.”213 Other jurists followed in the same vein, arguing that “[o]ne may not
object that the emperor is a ‘legibus solutus’ and can, therefore, particularly for
the crime of treason, omit a summons and proceed to judgment.”214
These responses to the struggle between Henry and Robert generated
precedents that were then developed further within the ius commune. For
instance, Nicholaus de Orsone “disputed the right of the King of Sicily to
allow royal judges to proceed against notorious suspects of violent crimes
without a hearing in the interest of public order.”215 This catalyzed the creation
of general norms that undermine any assertion that the prince had the power to
dispense with due process when the welfare of the state required it.
Responding favorably to these jurists’ consilia in the constitution known as
Saepe Contingit,216 Pope Clement V set the limits beyond which summary
procedures for emergency matters could not exceed, for instance in omitting
the summons and the opportunity to present a defense.217 This document
“came to form the substratum of most of the modern Continental systems” of
procedure.218 “The canonists were quick to gloss the Clementines [a later
collection issued by Pope John XXII that included Saepe] and incorporate its
provisions into the ius commune.”219
These collections were received, accepted, and glossed by the most
prominent fifteenth- century commentators.220 Although there were jurists who
did not agree with the principle that due process could not be abrogated in the
interest of public order,221 they were “completely out of step with the
jurisprudence of the ius commune,” as the mainstream had “rejected any
infringement on the right to due process.”222 By 1479, “two centuries of
Romano-canonical procedure law . . . [held] these procedural rules [forbidding
condemnation without summons and defense] were not just part of positive
canon law, but were based on a higher, natural law” which could not be
ignored.223 Accordingly, in his defense of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Francesco
Accolti (then acknowledged as the greatest living jurist) argued that Pope

213. Id. at 181–82.
214. Id. at 184.
215. Id. at 186.
216. STEPHAN KUTTNER, The Date of the Constitution “Saepe”, the Vatican Manuscripts and
the Roman Edition of the Clementines, in MEDIEVAL COUNCILS, DECRETALS, AND COLLECTIONS
OF CANON LAW 427, 427 (1980).
217. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 450 (2008).
218. Robert Wyness Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 28 YALE
L.J. 193, 193 (1928).
219. PENNINGTON, supra note 176, at 190.
220. See, e.g., DOROTHY OWEN, THE MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 10 (1990).
221. PENNINGTON, supra note 176, at 225.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 243.
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Sixtus IV had no right to condemn Lorenzo, since “[n]either the pope nor the
emperor can dispense with this part of the judicial process because no one can
ignore a precept of divine law.”224
B.

From Bracton to Fortescue: English Restrictions on the Executive in the
Late Medieval Era
1.

Bracton’s Insistence That the Law Is Superior to the King

Late medieval commentary on the powers of the English king begins with
the reaction to the work of Henry of Bracton (who was Guido of Suzzara’s
contemporary). Like Guido, Bracton was concerned with establishing the fact
that the king was subject to the laws. While he conceded that the king has no
superior225 (in a passage that has been frequently been misunderstood as a
statement extolling royal authority),226 Bracton asserted that “in spite of his
general authority, the king enjoys no privilege when he is the plaintiff in a lawsuit . . . the judge has to give his judgment just as if the plaintiff were the
humblest of the king’s subjects.”227 More importantly, Bracton argued that the
king is limited to using the laws, which give him no advantage against even the
least of his citizens: “[F]or the king is beneath no man, but under God and the
law.”228 This argument sets the tone for the development of a significant body
of English medieval jurisprudence that established that the king has no
extraordinary power to convict, attaint, or otherwise punish his subjects outside
of the channels of due process.
Following Isidore of Seville, Bracton concluded that the king must observe
not only the divine laws; he must also observe the human laws of the Corpus
iuris that had bound the emperor.229 He combined this view with his
interpretation of Digna Vox (and of Azo and the decretals of Innocent III
described above) and concluded that the king was not merely morally, but also
legally bound to observe the laws.230 His views had a formative effect on
English legal thought: Bracton “does not stand alone with this interpretation
[of the king’s legal duty to observe the law]. . . . [I]t may be observed that in
later times his interpretation was defended by writers on public law.”231 An

224. Id. at 252.
225. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 33 (G.E.
Woodbine ed., Yale Univ. Press 1992).
226. See, e.g., CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM 73 (Great Seal Books
rev. ed. 1958) (1947).
227. Schulz, supra note 154, at 149.
228. BRACTON, supra note 225, at 33.
229. Schulz, supra note 154, at 166.
230. Id. at 167–68.
231. Id. at 166, 168.
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interpolated text long thought to be authentic232 endorses the creation of an
enforcement mechanism should the king fail to govern according to the
laws.233 This appears to be an endorsement of the security clause of the
original Magna Carta.234
2.

The Magna Carta as Touchstone of English Constitutionalist Thought

Late medieval constitutionalism was no more popular with the Plantagenet
kings than with the Holy Roman Emperors, and accordingly, thirteenth and
fourteenth century England saw many attempts by its kings to liberate
themselves of the strictures of law. King John appealed almost immediately to
Innocent III for a bill that would declare the Great Charter invalid;235 this was
almost inevitable, since it unambiguously “placed the law higher than the
King” by imposing a clear “limitation on the power of the sovereign.”236
Obviously, this purported invalidation did not settle the issue. First, the
“reasons the pontiff gave for annulling the Charter were not the model of
lawyerly clarity.”237 Second, the idea behind the Magna Carta managed to
endure and grow, as Richard Helmholz asserted:
Despite its imperfections, Magna Carta survived. More than survive, it
flourished. It outlasted the death of King John, annulment by Pope Innocent
III, and revisions pruning the extent of the powers granted to the barons. It
assumed first place in the book of English statutes, served as a touchstone of
the liberties of the English nation during constitutional conflicts of later
centuries, and came in time to stand as a symbol of the rule of law against
238
tyranny by the state.

Edward Corwin suggested that the Charter grew in significance because it had
been “cast into a milieu favoring growth,”239 something which is evidenced by
the scope of legal commentary on the Corpus iuris and the incorporation of
these anti-absolutist provisions into the ius commune. However, in England,
“[Its] successful maintenance . . . demanded the cooperation of all classes and

232. H. KANTOROWICZ, BRACTONIAN PROBLEMS 54 (1941). Kantorowicz believed this text
had been written by Bracton himself.
233. Id.
234. MAGNA CARTA, Art. 61 (1215), reprinted in CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A
DOCUMENTARY COLLECTION ON PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 665 (Neil H.
Cogan ed., 1999).
235. R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the Ius Commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 361
(1999).
236. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Ordered Liberty: The Original Intent of the Constitution, 47
MD. L. REV. 174, 179–80 (1987).
237. Helmholz, supra note 235, at 362.
238. Id. at 299.
239. Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 176–77 (1928).
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so the participation of all classes in its benefits,”240 something which
contributed to the extra appeal and durability of these principles within English
law.
The Great Charter was reissued as a concession to the Barons a year after
King John’s death by the supporters of his son Henry III—who himself would
later be forced to call the first Parliament.241 This suggests how important the
idea that the king was subject to the law had grown in a short time. Corwin’s
assertion of the appeal of the Charter of Liberties to all classes was confirmed
when it was reissued by Henry III in 1225; Article 29’s application to all “free
[men]” was taken to mean that it granted liberties far beyond the knightly
class.242 The people’s desire for its liberties led them to pay the high price that
Henry charged for its reconfirmation—one fifteenth of every subject’s
moveable goods.243
The Charter’s power was greatly expanded through its reconfirmation by
Edward I, when in the Confirmation of Charters he ordered that:
[A]ll “justices, sheriffs, mayors, and other misters which under us and by us
have the laws of our land to guide,” to treat the Great Charter as “common
law,” in all pleas before them. Furthermore, any judgment contrary to the
Great Charter . . . was to be “holden for naught”; and all archbishops and
bishops were to pronounce “the sentence of Great Excommunication against
all those that by deed, aid or counsel” proceeded “contrary to the aforesaid
244
[Charter].”

Once again, an English king had made it clear that there could be no dispute
whether he was bound by the laws. However, it was during the reign of
Edward’s grandson, Edward III, that the charter achieved its medieval zenith.
In exchange for the taxes necessary to wage the Hundred Years’ War,
Edward III confirmed the Charter no less than fifteen times, a process that was
motivated by “a desire to get the king’s acknowledgement in general that he
was bound by the law.”245 Thanks in part to his repeated affirmations, this
principle was no longer disputable in England during the late Middle Ages
after Edward’s reign. The most important reaffirmations were the “six statutes”
interpreting Clause 29.246 The most important of these is the 1354 Statute of 28

240. Id. at 176.
241. Parliament, in HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 403 (Ronald H.
Fritze & William B. Robison eds., 2002). See also WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA
CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 154 (2d ed. 1914).
242. Corwin, supra note 239, at 177.
243. MCKECHNIE, supra note 241, at 154.
244. Corwin, supra note 239, at 177–78 (quoting SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH HISTORY
86–87 (George Burton Adams & Henry Morse Stephens eds., 1911)).
245. G. B. Adams, The Origin of the English Constitution, II, 13 THE AM. HIST. REV. 713,
721 n.15 (1908).
246. RALPH V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA: THROUGH THE AGES 123 (2003).
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Edward III.247 Chapter Three of this statute states that “no man of what estate
or condition that he be, shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken, nor
imprisoned, nor put to death without being brought in answer by due process
of the law.”248 This reinforced the Charter, which stated that:
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or
possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other
way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so,
249
except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.

It was now abundantly clear that Magna Carta’s guarantees of due process
applied without exception. Parliament also acted repeatedly to ensure the
protections of the Great Charter (as clarified and extended by the six statutes)
were made more durable. The 1368 Statute of 42 Edward III established (as
Coke noted in his Institutes) that any future statutes that purported to narrow
the protections of the Magna Carta would be null and void.250 This shows that
already by 1368, the Charter had become a critical element of the legal
tradition of England, which now contained rights that were permanent and
inviolable. Chapter Three of the statute states that “no man [shall] be put to
answer . . . [except] according to the old law of the land. And if anything from
henceforth be done to the contrary, it shall be void in the law, and holden for
error.”251
Additionally, Parliament attempted to ensure that the people were aware of
the protections of the Charter and ready to enforce their rights. Repeatedly, it
demanded that the king have the Magna Carta read out by his officials point by
point, that officials take oaths to uphold it, and that they be held accountable
when it was broken.252 The clergy were also called upon to excommunicate
those who offended it.253 It appears to be beyond dispute that Coke was right
when he asserted that by the conclusion of the reign of Edward III the Magna
Carta had attained the status of fundamental law; in modern terms, it was now
part of England’s unwritten constitution.254
After the reign of Edward III, the abuses of the early Plantagenet monarchs
were considered a source of shame for the English state and a salutary
reminder that the rule of law bound the king even in the most extreme
circumstances. The execution without trial of various rebels before the passage

247. 1354, 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.).
248. Id. (emphasis added).
249. Magna Carta, 1297, 25 Edw. 1, c. 29 (Eng.).
250. 1368, 42 Edw. 3, c. 1 (Eng.).
251. Id. at c. 3.
252. Faith Thompson, Parliamentary Confirmations of the Great Charter, 38 THE AM. HIST.
REV. 659, 664–68 (1933).
253. Id. at 668–69.
254. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *127–28.
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of the Edwardian law of treason and the six statutes of due process—which
now clearly barred this practice, and made it clear that Magna Carta contained
no exceptions for those accused of treason—were seen as bad precedents and
repudiated.255 This was true even for the case of Roger Mortimer, who had
deposed and murdered Edward II.256 A clearer example of treason could
scarcely be imagined, but his execution without due process was now held to
be odious and contrary to Magna Carta, such that Parliament was subsequently
eager to differentiate posthumous bills of attainder from Mortimer’s
sentence.257
While the late Plantagenets would clearly have preferred to govern as
absolute monarchs, that was now impossible: “[T]he royal power was
decisively curbed by [the reconfirmed] Magna Carta.”258 By the fifteenth
century, they could not appeal the logic of an emergency power to defend the
salus populi in the event to open treason and civil war, since this had now been
decisively rejected within English legal theory, and where now “the illegal
execution even of an outlawed felon could cause considerable outcry”259 from
the legal profession and the nobles, who remembered how they had been
oppressed by means of extraconstitutional assertions of emergency powers by
Edward II. The elevation of the Magna Carta to the status of fundamental law
and the condemnation of the sentencing of traitors contrary to its provisions
made it clear that the King of England possessed no power to ignore the
constitution even when confronted with serious threats to the state.
3.

Fortescue’s The Governance of England as Constitutionalist Thought

The final reconfirmation of the Magna Carta occurred in 1423, shortly
after the accession to the throne of Henry VI, who had became king at nine
months of age when his father, Henry V, died while on campaign in France.260
This was done to secure popular consent to the regency council headed by his
uncles, who in doing so affirmed their commitment to the principles of
medieval constitutionalism.261 The later Plantagenets and Lancastrian kings
had been required to govern in a constitutional manner, as the consent of the
people had become more important to effective governance due to the endemic

255. J. G. BELLAMY, THE LAW OF TREASON IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 184
(1970).
256. Id. at 66.
257. Id. at 184 n.1.
258. Id. at 6.
259. Id. at 184 n.1.
260. DAVID HUGHES, 1 THE BRITISH CHRONICLES 329 (2007).
261. See SUSANNE SAYGIN, HUMPHREY, DUKE OF GLOUCESTER (1390–1447) AND THE
ITALIAN HUMANISTS 51–53 (2002).
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labor shortages created by the Black Death.262 At the dawning of the early
modern era, however, England again faced challenges from rulers who sought
to depart from the established constitutionalist consensus.263
At this moment, England’s leading jurist felt compelled to write a text that
best demonstrates the full flowering of late medieval constitutionalism. Sir
John Fortescue, Lord Chief Justice of England under Henry VI from 1442, had
been driven into exile along with his king during the Wars of the Roses. From
1468 to 1470, he wrote a treatise entitled The Governance of England:
Otherwise Called the Difference Between an Absolute and a Limited Monarchy
(hereinafter Governance).264 Fortescue was concerned with describing the
constitutional principles that had been long established by the end of a dynasty,
where “royal authority was placed upon a proper footing, and seen to rest upon
the consent of the nation” and where “the Lancastrians always professed to
rule as constitutional kings.”265 The main thrust of this text was to reaffirm that
the English monarch was constrained by the laws.
This text elaborated upon an argument Fortescue had made earlier in De
Natura, which asserted that England’s government was a mixture of
monarchial and republican principles.266 Fortescue concluded that only laws to
which the people had given consent could be binding.267 Furthermore, the king
only had freedom to act in a manner that was defined by the laws; his “absolute
power,” or power to act directly without legal process, was confined to a
carefully circumscribed set of customary areas, but these may only be
exercised when they are not “contrary to law.”268
His next treatise, De Laudibus Legum Angliae (hereinafter Laws),
exercised great influence on the evolution of English jurisprudence. Fortescue,
following Roman precedents, asserts that the powers of the king are derived
from a grant of the people, a fact that establishes that he is subordinate to the
laws, since they predated the monarchy and allowed for the creation of the
monarchy.269 In his Laws, Fortescue asserts that a “king of England can not, at
his pleasure, make any alterations in the laws of the land, for the nature of his
government is not only regal, but political [i.e., not merely monarchial, but

262. See ROBERT C. PALMER, ENGLISH LAW IN THE AGE OF THE BLACK DEATH, 1348–1381,
at 59–61 (1993).
263. See THOMAS GARDEN BARNES, John Fortescue, in SHAPING THE COMMON LAW 46, 50–
58 (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2008).
264. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND: OTHERWISE CALLED THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN ABSOLUTE AND A LIMITED MONARCHY (Charles Plummer ed., 1885)
[hereinafter GOVERNANCE].
265. Id. at 2–3.
266. NEAL WOOD, FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 52 (1994).
267. Id.
268. GOVERNANCE, supra note 264, at 83.
269. WOOD, supra note 266, at 52.
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republican].”270 He disavows the common misinterpretation of Ulpian (which
he follows Bracton and Fleta in regarding as “the very principle of
autocracy”)271 stating that while an absolute monarch could affirm this maxim,
and English king cannot, as its laws:
[A]re made by their [the peoples’] own consent and approbation [and they]
enjoy their properties securely, and without the hazard of being deprived of
them, either by the king or any other . . . . St. Thomas [Aquinas] . . . wishes . . .
that the king might not be at liberty to tyrannize over his people; which only
comes to pass in the present case; that is, when the sovereign power is
272
restrained by political laws.

On the basis of this general theory, it is not surprising that Fortescue
concluded, with respect to emergency powers in particular, that there is a
“legal principle that no one may be put to death without trial.”273
In his Governance, Fortescue presents a well-elaborated and particularly
English variation of the early medieval argument that the king is bound to
observe the normal ordo iudicarius because they are not merely positive laws,
and adds to this a chilling predication of what would happen to the country if
they consented to absolutism:
Wherefore as often as such a king does anything against the law of God, or
against the law of nature, he does wrong . . . . [A] king should do to his
subjects what he would have done to himself, if he were a subject, which may
274
not be that he would be almost destroyed, as are the commons of France.

This theme would prove very influential to English political thought,
especially as differences emerged between the medieval constitutionalism
retained in England and the novel theories of sovereignty that developed on the
continent.
V. MEDIEVAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS TRANSFORMATION IN EARLY
MODERN ERA FRANCE AND ENGLAND
Fortescue and Francesco Accolti represent respectively the broad
consensus of the common and civil law jurists at the end of the Middle Ages
on the subject of the prince’s duty to obey the laws of due process under all
circumstances. One can also observe how they developed arguments to counter
the increasing absolutist claims being made by the rulers in this era who
purported to have emergency powers or who merely attempted to rule on this
270. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE: A TREATISE IN
COMMENDATION OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 26 (Andrew Amos ed., Francis Gregor trans.,
1874).
271. GOVERNANCE, supra note 264, at 184–85.
272. FORTESCUE, supra note 270, at 27.
273. GOVERNANCE, supra note 264, at 205.
274. Id. at 117.
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basis whenever they were strong enough to prevail against the guardians of the
medieval constitutionalist order.
During the first century of the early modern era, the rulers of what were
rapidly becoming centralized states put severe pressures on the existing
constitutional order found in both the common law and the ius commune. The
legal restraints on medieval rulers were challenged during the crises brought
about by the reformation, the dismemberment of the Holy Roman Empire, the
emergency of what would become modern states, and the warfare and rebellion
that erupted because of all of these developments.
It is at this time that a clear divergence emerges—as foreshadowed by
Fortescue—between the legal orders of England and France. This breach
became a rupture after these two countries’ civil wars. In the wake of France’s
civil war (usually called the French Wars of Religion), Henry IV was able to
rapidly consolidate and expand his power, setting the stage for the creation of
an absolute monarchy. The English Civil War took place forty years after the
conclusion of its French equivalent; conversely it was won by those who
resisted the Stuarts’s assumption of unconstitutional powers and drive towards
absolute rule. The English constitutionalists who prevailed advocated the rule
of law and the principle that a king had no emergency powers in a time of
crisis, which was the opposite of the legal regime created in France.
A.

The Demise of French Constitutionalism and the Rise of Jean Bodin’s
Ideas of the Undivided Sovereign Unbound by the Laws

Until the decisive turn taken in 1572, the French kings could be considered
constitutional monarchs.275 France’s “‘Renaissance monarchy’ was thus
expected to respect established law and not to alter it without consent.”276
However, due to the monarch’s greater degree of financial independence from
the other branches of government than in most other kingly states, the French
monarchy was able to govern between 1484 and 1560 without calling together
the Estates-General.277 This is because, as Fortescue noted, the burden of
regular taxation was much higher on the French people than that imposed on
the English, where the King of England would frequently need to appeal to
Parliament for emergency taxation during a crisis.278
However, the French king’s fiscal independence from his subjects did not
necessarily mean that he had a greater degree of control over these subjects
than his English counterpart. Just as Coke had argued in Bonham’s Case,

275. 2 MARVIN PERRY ET AL., WESTERN CIVILIZATION: IDEAS, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 377
(10th ed. 2011).
276. JULIAN H. FRANKLIN, JEAN BODIN AND THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY 3 (1973).
277. JAMES B. COLLINS, THE STATE IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE xxiv (1995).
278. GOVERNANCE, supra note 264, at 117. See also FORTESCUE, supra note 270, at 142–43.
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French judges argued that the king had no power to invoke his emergency
powers to draft rescripts that ignored the existing regulations of due process:
[A]mong French jurists of the early sixteenth century there was a cautious but
definite tendency to hold that plenitudo potestatis [the king’s absolute
privilege] could not be legitimately invoked in derogation of a rule of law that
the people had accepted and the ruler had confirmed . . . .
....
One consequence of this conception of the rule of law was the right of the
courts to repudiate orders of the king in the ordinary course of doing justice.
. . . The subjection of the king to law seemed so fundamental to the
commentators that they often insisted upon it without the slightest of
279
reservations.

In early sixteenth century French legal theory, one can see a clear echo of the
Corpus iuris: the king is held to have regal power, but he is bound not to
exercise it in a manner contrary to law.
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, it was clear that the French state
could no longer be governed in the old way. By 1572, there had been three
distinct “wars of religion,” civil wars waged by the Catholic and Huguenot
parties largely without the involvement of the monarch.280 That year, the
monarchy intervened decisively, and in a manner that clearly indicated their
abandonment of the principles of constitutional monarchy.281 After the
attempted assassination of the Admiral de Coligny, Charles IX’s mother
Catherine de’ Medici ordered the Swiss Guard to expel the remaining
Huguenot leaders from the Palace of the Louvre and to kill them in the
street.282 This was taken by the Catholic population of Paris as the green light
for a pogrom.283 Thousands were killed in Paris and perhaps tens of thousands
throughout the rest of the country, in what was later named the Saint
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre.284
On the fourth day of the killings, Charles issued a lit de justice, which
granted amnesty to those who participated in the massacre, alleging that he had

279. FRANKLIN, supra note 276, at 13, 15.
280. See MACK P. HOLT, THE FRENCH WARS OF RELIGION, 1562–1629, 70–72, 95, 96 (1995)
(discussing the monarchy’s inability to defeat the Huguenots during the three wars of religion).
See also BRUCE LINCOLN, DISCOURSE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE
STUDIES OF MYTH, RITUAL, AND CLASSIFICATION 92 (1989) (stating that three wars of religion
were fought between 1562 and 1570 against the Catholics and the Huguenots).
281. See FRANKLIN, supra note 276, at 43 (noting the French government turned to a criminal
solution for their problems with the Hugeunots by assassinating their leaders).
282. BARBARA A. SOMERVILL, CATHERINE DE MEDICI: THE POWER BEHIND THE FRENCH
THRONE 10–13 (2006).
283. HOLT, supra note 280, at 85.
284. THOMAS F.X. NOBLE ET AL., WESTERN CIVILIZATION: BEYOND BOUNDARIES 451 (5th
ed. 2008).
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authorized the first killings in order to preempt a conspiracy to assassinate his
family.285 “In this fashion a weak and incompetent government finally decided
upon a criminal solution to its difficulties.”286 In fact, within the paradigm of
medieval constitutionalism, it was worse than criminal: it was tyrannical.
There was a long line of jurisprudence stretching back to Aquinas that clearly
justified the conclusion that Charles IX was no longer a king and could be
justifiably overthrown.
As this conclusion was unacceptable to the French Catholic polity, the
massacre necessarily prefigured a transformation of ideas about sovereignty
and indeed, ethics:
[T]he doctrine of political murder . . . flourished during the sixteenth century
when the principles of social morality and Christian politics elaborated by the
theology of the Middle Ages, were replaced . . . [by] theories of a certain
287
raison d’état according to which the end justified the means.”

However, these views also needed a legal justification, lest the Huguenots
be able to present a persuasive justification for tyrannicide. This task fell
largely to an obscure and heterodox jurist who had been influenced by
humanist ideas in general and by Petrus Ramus in particular.288
Jean Bodin’s early work touched upon the idea of sovereignty and clung
largely to constitutionalist views,289 but four years after the Saint
Bartholomew’s Day massacre, he published his Six Books of the
Commonwealth, which created a new paradigm for both sovereign and
executive power during emergencies.290 Bodin rejected the prevailing
foundations on principle.291 This meant a rejection of the idea of sovereignty
derived from the Corpus iuris, which had undergirded all Western public law
for millennia. He also flatly rejected the idea of a mixed constitution, in which
sovereignty was divided between various branches of government. Drawing
upon partial and incomplete surveys of history, Bodin:

285. LINCOLN, supra note 280, at 98.
286. FRANKLIN, supra note 276, at 43.
287. Georges Goyau, Saint Bartholomew’s Day, in 13 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds., 1912), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/133
33b.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
288. For details on the half-educated, grandiose and thoroughly specious anti-scholasticism of
Petrus Ramus, see Ryan Patrick Alford, How Do You Trim the Seamless Web? Considering the
Unintended Consequences of Pedagogical Alterations, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1273, 1277 (2009).
289. See FRANKLIN, supra note 276, at 23 (explaining that Bodin’s earlier work excludes
absolutism from his discussion on the principle of sovereignty).
290. JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 10–11, 14–15, 24–25 (M. J. Tooley
trans., 1967) (1955).
291. Martin van Gelderen, Aristotleians, Monarchomachs and Republicans: Sovereignty and
respublica mixta in Dutch and German Political Thought, 1580–1650, in 1 REPUBLICANISM: A
SHARED EUROPEAN HERITAGE 195, 197 (Martin van Gelderen & Quentin Skinner eds., 2002).
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[A]ttempted to derive the contents of supreme authority [that which a king
possesses] from the concept of supremacy itself . . . . He was always thinking
of ‘the sovereign’ as one part of the society that rules the rest, according to the
familial model of a kingship . . . a mixed constitution seemed a contradiction
. . . . The fallacy in all of this is so transparent to the modern reader, and so
profoundly foreign, that it is sometimes tempting to look for deeper lines of
292
reasoning.

There is no deeper logic to Bodin’s essential argument about the
indivisibility of sovereignty, which is the sole basis for his argument that the
king of France is not bound by the laws. “The entire case is thus colored by a
petitio principii [an argument that asks the listener to grant the conclusion in
the guise of a premise]: Sovereign authority is absolute; The king of France is
sovereign; [therefore] The king of France is absolute.”293 Bodin argues away
all the evidence that kings are bound by laws, first by dispensing with all
Roman law for allegedly being inadequate, and by arguing that coronation
oaths (in which many European kings explicitly promised to be bound by the
laws) are not supported by consideration.294
“Bodin’s only justification of this odd result is drawn from practical
necessity.”295 The Huguenots—adhering to medieval constitutionalism—were
right in saying the king has exceeded his powers to the point of being no king
at all, but rather a tyrant who may be lawfully resisted. The only solution is to
reject their legal paradigm claim that the king cannot be bound by the laws,
and when faced with an alleged emergency such as the rumored plot to murder
Charles IX, he was not bound to put the conspirators on trial. Instead, he could
simply condemn those subjects he accused of treason on his own authority.
This theory served to legitimize a range of notorious abuses. In 1574, the
Huguenot leader the Duke François of Montmorency was arrested and jailed in
the Bastille on nothing more than Charles’s verbal orders, later affirmed by
letters-patent.296 This action set the precedent for the lettres de cachet that
authorized the indefinite detention of innumerable political prisoners.297 These
orders, which sent the named person directly to prison without any contact
whatsoever with the judicial system became ubiquitous:
The lettres de cachet, one of the most typical institutions of old French
society, have been aptly called ‘the very essence of public life’ before the
Revolution. Upon them rested the authority of king . . . . Although it is

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

FRANKLIN, supra note 276, at 25–28.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 57–59.
Id. at 59.
FRANCOIS-ANDRE ISAMBERT, 14 RECUEIL GÉNÉRAL DES ANCIENNES LOIS FRANÇAISES
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297. See BRIAN E. STRAYER, LETTRES DE CACHET AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE ANCIEN
RÉGIME, 1659–1789, at xi (1994).
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commonly believed that the employment of lettres de cachet was largely
298
confined to affairs of state, yet this is far from the truth.

Jacques Maritain notes “Jean Bodin is rightly considered the father of the
modern theory of Sovereignty.”299 Maritain traced the development of the
theory of absolute executive power from Bodin through Hobbes300—who also
wrote during a civil war with a motivation similar to Bodin’s—and “versions
of sovereignty evocative of Hobbes’s and Bodin’s have carried forth into the
twentieth century.”301 The divergence between classical, continental, and
Anglo-American approaches to emergency powers hinge on the acceptance or
rejection of Bodin’s theses about the necessary features of a sovereign power.
The next section will demonstrate that it was the reaction to this absolutism
that led to the triumph of constitutionalist thought in England and to its
transmission to America.
A.

The Rejection of Stuart Absolutism in Seventeenth Century England

Seventeenth century England faced a crisis similar to that which had led to
the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre after the dynastic transfer from the House
of Tudor to the House of Stuart.302 Like the Bourbons, the Stuarts were
outsiders;303 they hailed from a country with a monarchy that was much
stronger than the one they came to govern.304 James had views on executive
power that were clearly not compatible with the constitutionalism of the
English bar. Before coming to the English throne, he had written a defense of
quasi-absolutism entitled The True Law of Free Monarchies: “[T]he essence of
a free monarchy was that royal power was limited by no human law.”305
Unfortunately for James, the political conditions under which James I
came to the throne were very different from those of Henry IV thirty years
earlier. The existing constitutional restraints were much more formidable,
thanks to the reaffirmation of “higher law” or “fundamental law”
constitutionalism during the Elizabethan era.306 In the Jacobean era, common

298. Fred Morrow Fling, Mirabeau, a Victim of the Lettres de Cachet, 3 THE AM. HIST. REV.
1, 19 (1897).
299. JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 31 (1951).
300. Id. at 28–53.
301. Dan Philpott, Sovereignty, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (June 8, 2010), http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/sovereignty/.
302. See J. P. SOMMERVILLE, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN ENGLAND, 1603–1640, at 9
(1986).
303. SIOBHAN KEENAN, RENAISSANCE LITERATURE 14 (2008).
304. John Cairns, Historical Introduction, in 1 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN SCOTLAND:
INTRODUCTION AND PROPERTY 74, 77–78 (2000).
305. See SOMMERVILLE, supra note 302, at 37.
306. Ryan Patrick Alford, The Star Chamber and the Regulation of the Legal Profession
1570–1640: Re-evaluating Revisionism, 51 AM. J.L. HIST. 639, 662–63 (2011). See also ALAN
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lawyers still agreed with Fortescue that the executive prerogative was subject
to legal definition and subordinate to the subject's legal liberties, such as the
absolute rights to one's property and to the guarantees specified in the Magna
Carta.307
1.

Constitutional and Absolutist Ideas of the Stuarts’ Royal Prerogative

From the beginning of James’s reign, divergent views of the king's ability
to define the scope of his own powers emerged. Three key court cases from
early Stuart era illustrate the decline in relations between the Crown and the
constitutionalist opposition in Parliament. These cases also demonstrate that
the issue that was most fundamental to this conflict was the rule of law. Bates’s
Case involves powers to regulate matters related to foreign affairs so as to
serve (the king’s views of) the public interest;308 The Five Knights’ Case
relates to the power to imprison citizens for reasons of state without formal
charge;309 and the Case of the Ship Money is about the power of the purse after
the king declares a public emergency.310 In the course of these lawsuits, one
can observe the emergence of a robust theory of the rule of law at a crucial
juncture in Anglo-American jurisprudence. One can also note that this was
catalyzed by the rejection of Stuart arguments that the executive has the power
to ignore the laws when it allegedly acts to protect the public welfare.
a.

Bates’s Case: James’s Absolute Prerogative to Protect the Common
Good

In the course of many attempts to raise funds, James often asserted that his
powers were unlimited because of his duty to attend to matters of state and to
protect the nation.311 He asserted further that he was the sole judge over
whether any danger to the public existed, and resisted any attempts to force
him to disclose his reasons or justify his conclusions.312 One pertinent early
example of this argument can be found in the record of Bates’s Case (1606),
where a merchant challenged the king’s power to raise the import duties,
something which he argued belonged to Parliament alone since time
immemorial.313 However, in a very controversial decision Chief Baron

CROMARTIE, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST REVOLUTION: AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND,
1450–1642, at 148, 153 (2006).
307. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION:
REVISITED 234 (1997).
308. Bates’s Case, (1606) 145 Eng. Rep. 267.
309. The Case of the Five Knights, (1627) 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (K.B.).
310. Ship Money, (1637) 3 How. St. Tr. 825.
311. See JAMES I, THE TRUE LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES AND BASILIKON DORON 72 (Daniel
Fischlin & Mark Fortier eds., 1996).
312. Id.
313. Bates’s Case, (1606) 145 Eng. Rep. 267.
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Fleming ruled that the King possessed a plenary power to act for the welfare of
all his subjects that was not restrained by the law.314 This prefigured many later
arguments for broad emergency powers for the executive drawing upon the
concept of necessity. Discussing Bates’s Case, Johann Sommerville (quoting
Fleming) described its rationale as follows:
‘The king's power is double, ordinary and absolute’ . . . . His ordinary power
applied in cases where the public interest was not involved, and here the
monarch was bound by the common law. . . . But in matters which concerned
‘the general benefit of the people’ the king possessed an absolute power,
subject only to the rules of ‘Policy and Government.’ The implications of these
rules, said Fleming, were to be determined by ‘the wisdome of the king, for the
common good’ and ‘all things done within these rules are lawful.’ If the king
decided that something was in the public interest, it was not fit for subjects to
315
question his judgment . . . .

Despite the looming implications of this interpretation of the executive
prerogative when matters of state were invoked, following Bates’s Case, this
action was legally unassailable: the king had merely to say that he was acting
in the public interest to settle the issue, even when he was clearly abusing his
power and damaging the common interest that he was sworn to protect.
Unfortunately for James, the precedent provided by this case could not
protect him from Parliament or their closest allies among the common-law
judges, since they believed that the decision had ignored certain basic premises
of the English constitution.316 More importantly, the constitutionalist
opposition believed that this extraparliamentary taxation threatened to destroy
the English constitution itself and would allow James to govern as an absolute
monarch, since if he had ready access to revenue without needing to call
Parliament, no laws could ever be passed to challenge or even censure his
abuses.317
b.

Charles’s Alleged Prerogative to Imprison Dissidents for Reasons of
State

James’s successor, Charles I, inherited the same constitutional and
financial dilemmas endemic to his father’s reign. As the Parliamentary
opposition had feared, Charles suspended Parliament in order to prevent them
from presenting a public complaint about the collection of taxes that they had
not approved, something which they argued made “the hearts of your people

314.
315.
267).
316.
317.

Id.
SOMMERVILLE, supra note 302, at 152 (quoting Bates’s Case, (1606) 145 Eng. Rep.
Id. at 162.
Id.
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. . . full of fear of innovation and change of government.”318 Accordingly,
Charles chose to pretend that these taxes were merely loans from his
subjects.319 The “Forced Loan” fooled no one at the time, and arguments
circulated that this specific practice had been banned by medieval statutes.320
These arguments further stated that the king could not use his prerogative to
ignore a statute and violate his subjects’ absolute right to their property.321 The
resistance to this policy led to two historically significant confrontations
between the king and Parliament on the issue of the scope of the prerogative.
The first of these battles was waged over the passage of the Petition of
Right, a statute that would later be seen as part of the fundamental laws of
England, in which—like Magna Carta—Parliament held the king could not
ignore the laws under any circumstances, including national emergencies.322
“The Petition [of Right] acknowledged no emergency royal powers of taxation.
The claim of necessity, in short, did not justify the king in flouting the law. It
was, in any case, self-contradictory to infringe the liberties of the subject for
the sake of promoting the public good.”323
The Petition of Right also sought to take away the king's prerogative to
imprison citizens without formal charge in exceptional cases.324 This practice
had also been called into question during the Five Knights’ Case, which is
known today as a precedent stating that habeas corpus may not be suspended
by the executive branch.325 The petitioners had been arrested in 1627 under
Charles’s orders for having resisted the forced loan.326 The matter was of
paramount importance, as the king’s prerogative to temporarily imprison a
subject on the basis of his emergency powers to protect the public had never
before been challenged.327 While the case was decided on very narrow
grounds, the case—and more importantly, its aftermath in Parliament—made it
clear that the king’s allegedly absolute prerogative had some legal limits.328
In the course of proceedings, Attorney General Sir Edward Heath argued
that the king had both the power to issue commands that were defined by the
318. 1 JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF PRIVATE PASSAGES OF STATE:
1618–1629, at 626 (1721), available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=70
154.
319. L. J. REEVE, CHARLES I AND THE ROAD TO PERSONAL RULE 14 (2003).
320. Id.
321. Alford, supra note 306, at 691–93.
322. DAVID L. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL ROYALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT,
C. 1640–1649, at 29 (2002).
323. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 302, at 158.
324. See FRANCES HELEN RELF, THE PETITION OF RIGHT 1, 27 (1917).
325. Riddhi Dasgupta, Boumediene v. Bush and Extraterritorial Habeas Corpus in Wartime,
36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 425, 443 (2009).
326. SMITH, supra note 322, at 29.
327. JUDITH FARBEY ET AL., THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 8–9 (3d ed. 2011).
328. Id. at 10–12.
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law of the land and an “absoluta potestas that the sovereign has. But when I
call it [absolute power] I do not mean that it is such a power as that a king may
do what he please, for he has rules to govern himself by.”329 However, royalist
theorists argued that only the king himself could judge his own adherence to
these rules.330 Following Fleming, they argued that no one else could challenge
him when he argued that special circumstances existed that allowed him to use
his absolute power in defense of the common good, or question whether he had
done so within the appropriate limits set by the law of God.331 Unsurprisingly,
the constitutionalists considered this argument unacceptable.
Disputes over this argument for absolute emergency powers spilled over
into the debates surrounding the drafting and passing of the Petition of Right.
Constitutionalists complained that the king’s theory was precluded by the
explicit terms of the Magna Carta;332 royalist theorists such as William
Lambarde333 had earlier argued that while:
[The] Magna Carta had re-established the rule of the common law in many
areas . . . kings retained the old ‘absolute Authoritie’ in ‘a few rare and
singular Cases’. . . .
. . . [Accordingly, the Member of Parliament Edward] Alford had warned
the Commons that as long as ‘matters of state’ remained undefined the royal
334
power was subject to abuse.

Charles resisted the passage of the Petition of Right, as he correctly
predicted that his power to raise taxes without Parliament and to imprison
those who resisted without showing any cause would prove vital to his survival
in the years to come.335 Summarizing the arguments of his supporters,
Sommerville notes the royalists’ argument that:
[K]ings rule not only by the common law but by ‘a law of state’ . . . . ‘The
common law,’ he said, ‘doth not provide for matters of state.’ Where such
matters were at issue, the king was to govern by the law of state, and could ride
roughshod over liberties guaranteed by the inferior and irrelevant common
law. The king’s power of imprisoning without cause shown was ‘committed to
him by God.’ Of course he could suppress the cause, for ‘every state hath
336
secreta regni’ (secrets of the kingdom—i.e., state secrets).

329. J. W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 72 (1955).
330. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 49 (1999).
331. Id.
332. RELF, supra note 324, at 29–33.
333. Alford, supra note 306, at 653–58.
334. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 302, at 164–65.
335. Alford, supra note 306, at 715–23.
336. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 302, at 167–68 (quoting the speeches of Serjeant Ashley in
Parliament).
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Owing to considerable financial pressures, Charles finally proved willing
to sign the Petition of Right into law by the spring of 1628 if a caveat were to
be added—namely, that the statute did not affect his sovereign power.337
Parliament refused.338 Alford used the debate to both rebuke the king and to
explicitly denounce the new concept of sovereignty as it had been articulated
by Jean Bodin, which undergirded the royalist position.339 He asked,
rhetorically: “What is sovereign power? Bodin says that it is free from any
condition. By [agreeing to] this, we shall acknowledge a regal as well as a
legal power.”340 Parliament, following Alford's advice, refused to acknowledge
the existence of an extraordinary prerogative or indeed any absoluta
potestas.341 For similar reasons, it rejected an amendment proposed by the
House of Lords that would allow the king to imprison subjects for a limited
time without showing cause “for reasons of state.”342 Coke noted that allowing
this would amount to Parliament’s recognition of “an intrinsic prerogative . . .
[that] no law can take . . . away.”343
c.

Hampden’s Case and the Rule of Law’s Applicability to Wartime
Powers

In 1635, Charles again resorted to extra-parliamentary taxation in order to
raise funds.344 On the legal advice of his councilors, he attempted to disguise
this taxation with various transparent fictions, so that his measures might
pretend not to be unprecedented.345 The raising of “Ship Money” (as these
levies were imposed in lieu of the obligation to furnish ships) was justified
with the assertion that these funds were to be spent on coastal defense,
although it was obvious that they would instead be used to pay Charles’s
debts.346 Despite Charles’s dubious assertions, there had been no general

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

PAULINE GREGG, KING CHARLES I, at 172 (1984).
Id.
GLENN BURGESS, ABSOLUTE MONARCHY AND THE STUART CONSTITUTION 64 (1996).
Id.
GREGG, supra note 337, at 173–74.
H. G. KOENIGSBERGER, MONARCHIES, STATES GENERALS AND PARLIAMENTS: THE
NETHERLANDS IN THE FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES 333 (2001).
343. Paul Christianson, Ancient Constitutions in the Age of Sir Edward Coke and John
Selden, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLOAMERICAN TRADITION OF THE RULE OF LAW 115, 172 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993).
344. CHRISTOPHER HAIGH, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND IRELAND 200 (1990).
345. Cf. id. (the fines in distraint of knighthood, based upon long-obsolete and forgotten
thirteenth-century statutes).
346. F. C. MONTAGUE, 7 THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND: THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND
FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES I TO THE RESTORATION 1603–1660, at 178 (William Hunt &
Reginald L. Poole eds., 1969).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

IS AN INVIOLABLE CONSTITUTION A SUICIDE PACT?

403

resistance to the imposition of Ship Money in 1634.347 This is likely because
there had been some recent precedents for raising Ship Money in times of
peril.348 However, in 1635 Charles made the mistake of attempting to raise
Ship Money in inland counties further from the maritime communities, which
had never been previously subjected to the imposition.349 Charles gave only his
implicit promise that it would fund the Navy, but he insisted that he had no
duty to answer any questions from his subjects about whether or not it had
actually been spent on maritime defense.350
John Hampden’s refusal to pay set the stage for the last great confrontation
between the king and the constitutionalist opposition before the Civil War. In
Sir David Keir's words, “[T]he point before the Court . . . was the same that
had already been decided in Bates’s Case and Darnel’s [the Five Knights’]
Case . . . . The problem was to determine the King's discretionary power to act
for the public good.”351 Oliver St. John argued for Hampden that if the king
alone was the judge of whether an emergency existed and also the sole judge
of the scope of his prerogative, then no English subject had any property
rights.352 This of course was a summary of the primary complaint found in the
Petition of Right, which had asserted that this absolutist principle was not
consistent with the “fundamental propriety in his goods and a fundamental
liberty of his person,” rights which the constitutionalists argued that king was
bound by the law to respect, even during emergencies.353
Summarizing and quoting the King’s Counsel’s response, Keir describes it
in the following terms:
[The king] is an absolute monarch. . . . ‘As he is an absolute monarch, so all
these iura summae magistatis [powers of the supreme majesty] are given unto
his person by the common law.’ . . . His bona fides must be presumed. . . .
Parliament must not even inquire into whether the King has used his ordinary
354
revenue for the purpose. It is improper to scrutinize his expenditure.

Sir Edward Crawley (another barrister for the king) “quoted Commines and
[Jean] Bodin in support of the king's right to levy money . . . remarking that
these ‘wrote not according to the law of any one kingdom, but according to the

347. KENNETH R. ANDREWS, SHIPS, MONEY AND POLITICS: SEAFARING AND NAVAL
ENTERPRISE IN THE REIGN OF CHARLES I, at 131 (1991).
348. SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 6 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 49–50 (7th ed. 1957).
349. ANDREWS, supra note 347, at 131–50.
350. Id.
351. D. L. Keir, The Case of the Ship-Money, 52 LAW Q. REV. 546, 548 (1936).
352. WILLIAM PALMER, THE POLITICAL CAREER OF OLIVER ST. JOHN, 1637–1649, at 26–27
(1993).
353. GOUGH, supra note 329, at 70.
354. Keir, supra note 351, at 560 & n.73.
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law of reason,’”355 asserting that necessity, as assessed by the king, was always
superior to the law of the land.
Gough noted that Sir Robert Berkeley’s judgment conceded the existence
of “fundamental policy, and maxims, and rules of law for the government of
the realm,” that barred extra-parliamentary taxation, but:
[The idea] that this ‘fundamental policy in the creation of the frame of this
kingdom’ meant that the king could be restrained if he tried to raise money
except through parliament, he was ‘utterly mistaken herein’. . . .
Berkeley described the arguments of Hampden's counsel, in often-quoted
words, as ‘a king-yoking policy’, and declared [quoting one of King James I's
most provocative assertions of absolute power] that he ‘never heard that lex
was rex [that law was king] but rather the reverse, for the King was lex
356
loquens, a living, a speaking, an acting law’.

This theory of the king’s prerogative prevailed in this case with a narrow
majority,357 despite the fact that it reversed centuries of precedent from
Bracton to Fortescue and beyond. The ruling depended on the argument from
necessity: “In a case of necessity, [Justice Berkeley] said, the king had ‘regal
power’ to make extra-parliamentary levies,”358 and held that he alone was the
judge of the necessity, rejecting Littleton’s arguments that these emergencies
should be brought to Parliament’s attention.359 This judgment was an extension
of the logic of Baron Fleming’s decision in Bates’s Case.360
What was different about this decision was that it explicitly ignored an
intervening statute—the Petition of Right—that Parliament had passed in order
to prevent the king from taking precisely these sorts of actions.361 Following
Berkeley’s reasoning, Parliament could never bind the king, since he could
operate above the statutes whenever he declared an emergency, even in
peacetime. On this logic, he was not even bound by the Magna Carta, which
had been repeatedly reaffirmed by successive monarchs in exchange for grants
of taxes and other impositions.362 The court had thus declared England to be
closer to an absolute monarchy—not only in practice, but also in theory—than
at any time since the reign of Edward II.

355. GOUGH, supra note 329, at 75.
356. GOUGH, supra note 329, at 71.
357. ROBERT BUCHOLZ & NEWTON KEY, EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 1485–1714: A
NARRATIVE HISTORY 241 (2d ed. 2009).
358. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 302, at 162.
359. Id. at 158, 162.
360. Id. at 161–62.
361. PALMER, supra note 352, at 45.
362. William Conrad Gibbons, The Origins of the War Power Provision of the Constitution,
in CONGRESS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE IN THE
NUCLEAR AGE 9, 16–17 (Michael A. Barnhart ed., 1987).
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It would not be long until the backlash against absolutism and the
accompanying reckoning. The judges who had concurred in Berkeley’s
judgment were impeached in 1641.363 Soon thereafter Charles himself was
executed for treason to the realm, after being convicted for violating his
coronation oath to rule in accordance with the law of the land.364 In a direct
rebuke to the opinions detailed above, the prosecutor at Charles’s trial asserted
that “it is one of the fundamentals of law, [t]hat the king is not above the law,
but the law above the king.”365 The maximalist interpretation of salus populi
suprema lex est has only ever been advanced openly by one English monarch
(Charles I), and this led directly to his execution.366 Later attempts to revive
this maxim in a more limited form only led to the destruction of his dynasty
and its replacement by the House of Hanover.367 More importantly, one can see
that the maxim was decisively rejected within the Anglo-American
constitutional tradition because of its absolutist implications.
VI. THE MAXIMS OF EARLY MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN TREATISES
The question that remains is this: if the principle that salus populi suprema
lex est was repeatedly and decisively rejected within Anglo-American law,
why does it seem to have some weight within modern American legal
discourse? It will be demonstrated in this Part that the maxim was given some
attention in the early modern era, but only with a carefully circumscribed
meaning that is rather different from that assigned by Gross and Paulsen. One
must first consider the status of a maxim within English law.
A.

Sir Francis Bacon and the Idea of the Maxims of the Common Law

Maxims are defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as: “A traditional legal
principle that has been frozen into a concise expression. Examples are
‘possession is nine-tenths of the law’ and caveat emptor (‘let the buyer
beware’). Also termed legal maxim.”368 They are considered legal principles

363. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 105TH CONG., IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED
MATERIALS 642 (Comm. Print 1973).
364. BLAIR WORDEN, GOD’S INSTRUMENTS: POLITICAL CONDUCT IN THE ENGLAND OF
OLIVER CROMWELL 263 (2012).
365. The Trial of Charles Stuart, King of England: Before the High Court of Justice, for High
Treason: 24 Charles I. A.D. 1649, in 4 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS
AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT 989, 1019 (Thomas B. Howell ed., 1809).
366. WORDEN, supra note 364, at 263.
367. Edward Vallance, The Dangers of Prudence: Salus Populi Suprema Lex, Robert
Sanderson, and the ‘Case of the Liturgy, in THE RENAISSANCE CONSCIENCE 100, 116–17 (Harald
E. Braun & Edward Vallance eds., 2011). Accord JOHN R. GRAHAM, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF SUCCESSION 70 (2002).
368. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (9th ed. 2009).
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only in the loosest sense of that word, since they are not sources of law in and
of themselves, but only paraphrases of general principles, which do not define
the scope of their own application.
This modern understanding of the legal force of a maxim is in line with the
traditional view of English common lawyers. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen
observed, “It seems to me that legal maxims in general are little more than pert
headings of chapters. They are rather minims than maxims . . . . As often as
not, the exceptions and qualifications to them are more important than the socalled rules.”369 However, civilian jurists had a much higher opinion of
maxims, since in the Corpus Iuris they had binding legal force; they were
regulae juris.370 Not coincidentally, the first collection of the ‘maxims’ of
English law371 involves an attempt to create entirely new sources of English
law that would align it with the civil law, and which would displace existing
precedent. This task was undertaken by Sir Francis Bacon, who was heavily
invested in the attempt to reframe the laws of England so as to make them
much more accommodating to James’s authoritarian impulses.372
James’s first attempt to recast English law came couched within a proposal
for the union of the realms of Scotland and England.373 This realignment would
surely have been advantageous to the crown, as Scotland was (and is) a civil
law jurisdiction, where the king was not bound by such fundamental laws as
the Magna Carta and the six due process statutes of Edward III, but merely by
Digna Vox.374 Bacon had already been advocating a codification of English
law, and “following the example of the great law reformers Justinian and
Edward I [authoritarians both]” he “repeatedly urged the role of Solomonic
lawgiver on both Elizabeth and James.”375 Bacon used the proposal for the
union of the realms to advocate for codification of English common law.376
After this failed, Bacon proposed a codification of the penal laws of the realm,
something he again recommended to the King in 1614.377

369. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 94 n.1
(1883).
370. See PETER STEIN, REGULAE IURIS: FROM JURISTIC RULES TO LEGAL MAXIMS 2, 90, 101
(1966).
371. Apart from a “small stock of maxims” drawn from Boniface VIII’s Liber Extra of 1234
found in the early yearbooks. See Roscoe Pound, The Maxims of Equity, 34 HARV. L. REV. 809,
828 (1921).
372. See, e.g., DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, FRANCIS BACON 31, 70 (1992).
373. See, e.g., Brian P. Levack, Introduction to THE JACOBEAN UNION: SIX TRACTS OF 1604,
at ix–x (Bruce R. Galloway & Brian P. Levack eds., 1985).
374. Id. at xxxv–xlii (1984).
375. Barbara Shapiro, Sir Francis Bacon and the Mid-Seventeenth Century Movement for
Law Reform, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 338 (1980).
376. Id. at 350.
377. 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 705 (1959).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

IS AN INVIOLABLE CONSTITUTION A SUICIDE PACT?

407

In 1621, Bacon presented the results of a five-year effort to “recompile”
the law of England and strike down over 600 statutes.378 Unfortunately for
Bacon’s proposal, this was also the year in which he fell from grace. At his
impeachment, Bacon plead guilty to charges of bribery, confessing in response
to every charge “that I am guilty of corruption.”379 His official influence
having come to an end, Bacon attempted to build broader support for his
reform efforts informally, by circulating three preparatory texts.380
Each of these texts was distributed in inverse proportion to its frankness.
Early in his career, Bacon had written A Collection of Some Principal Rules
and Maxims of the Common Laws.381 Note that he was already identifying the
maxims not as paraphrases of general principles (as was customary at common
law, and as found in the work of Bracton and Fortescue),382 but rather with
binding regula iuris, as did the civilian jurists.383 When he was at the height of
his power and codification seemed an attainable goal, he wrote the Example of
a Treatise on Universal Justice or the Fountains of Equity, by Aphorisms and
finally the Aphorisms on the Greater Law of Nations, or the Fountains of
Justice and Law.384
The first text was in English, the better for the wide audience Bacon hoped
to receive.385 Curiously, the maxims themselves are in untranslated Latin.386
Bacon noted in his preface that he chose Latin since it was “of the greatest
authority and majesty to be avouched and alledged [sic] in argument.”387 He
was attempting to invest them with “a kind of mysterious halo” that frequently
“has had . . . the effect of preventing proper inquiry into their meaning.”388

378. Shapiro, supra note 375, at 351.
379. Markku Peltonen, Bacon, Francis, Viscount St Alban (1561–1626), OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/990 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2013).
380. Id.
381. FRANCIS BACON, Maxims of the Law, in 4 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 16 (James
Spedding et al. eds., 1803).
382. Pound, supra note 371, at 832.
383. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 370, at 2, 101.
384. Francis Bacon, Aphorisms on the Greater Law of Nations or the Fountains of Justice and
Law, edited by Mark S. Neustadt as part of his Ph.D. thesis, The Making of the Instauration:
Science, Politics, and Law in the Career of Francis Bacon (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
John Hopkins University).
385. Latin was being rapidly supplanted by English as the language of literary culture in
seventeenth-century England. See Richard L. Venezky, The Development of Literacy in the
Industrialized Nations of the West, in 2 HANDBOOK OF READING RESEARCH 60 (Rebecca Barr et
al. eds., 1996).
386. FRANCIS BACON, Preface to Maxims of the Law, in 4 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON,
supra note 381, at 13.
387. Id.
388. Jeremiah Smith, The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. L. REV. 13, 25 (1895).
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Bacon seems to have considered this an implicit argument for the conclusion
that his maxims should have the force of the civil law’s regulae.
In this Elizabethan work, there is very little mention of salus populi.
However, he slips the maxim into his discussion of Regula XII.389 This twelfth
maxim (which Bacon creates by synthesizing a set of rather diverse
precedents) is receditur à placitis juris, potius quam injuriae et delicta
maneant impunita (pleas of law shall be receded from, so that crimes and
injuries shall not go unpunished).390 Here, Bacon turns his endeavor entirely on
its head, stating that in this case, those principles to which the maxim refers do
not deserve the status of regulae at all, but merely a placita juris (pleas of law,
being grounds of learning rather than binding rules).391 Bacon is forced to
admit that it is a “rule” that “penal statutes shall not be taken by [construed
with principles appropriate to]392 equity.”393 However, he clearly wishes that
this were not the case, as he argues that it is better that the law dispense with
principles that protect the accused “rather than crimes . . . [go] unpunished,” as
“quia salus populi suprema lex; and salus populi is contained in repressing
offences by punishment.”394
Another more tangential discussion of the salus populi in this text comes in
his explanation of the maxim necessitas inducit privilegium quoad [sic] iura
privata (necessity induces a privilege because of a private right). This
principle, still extant in the common law, establishes such rights as that of a
ship’s master to tie his ship to a private dock when it would otherwise be
destroyed (subject to the dock owner’s right of compensation should the dock
be damaged thereby).395 Bacon then takes this principle and twists it further
than it can bear, without any citation of authority. He argues that the right
created by private necessity does not run against the state.396 With no statute or
case to rely upon, Bacon states, “[T]he law impose[s] [the duty] upon every
subject, that he prefer the urgent service of his prince and country before the
safety of his life.”397 However, his Maxims make no attempt to define the

389. BACON, supra note 381, at 50–52.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. See, e.g., 7 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS
FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO
THE PRESENT 1539 (Thomas B. Howell ed., 1816).
393. BACON, supra note 381, at 52.
394. Id. at 50.
395. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
396. BACON, supra note 381, at 35.
397. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

IS AN INVIOLABLE CONSTITUTION A SUICIDE PACT?

409

powers of the king towards his subjects, since discussion of the scope of the
privilege was assiduously avoided during Elizabeth’s reign.398
When this subject exploded to the forefront of legal discourse in the wake
of Bates’s Case and the Five Knight’s Case, Bacon had much to say about his
patron’s powers, although he took precautions against his words being fully
understood by his enemies. Both the Aphorisms on Universal Justice and the
Aphorisms on the Law of Nations were written entirely in Latin, a language
that many lawyers of that time could not have read without difficulty.399 In
Aphorisms on the Greater Law of Nations, his approach was more ambitious:
The Maximes considered only the first level of law . . . . The Aphorismi went
beyond this level to look at first principles: the origins of law, how and why
law grew over time, and what authority meant and how it legitimated law.
Certain of the aphorisms Bacon set down are clearly the work of a man who
had read Machiavelli and who would serve as the mentor of a young Thomas
400
Hobbes.

His analysis in these works was wholly consistent with the absolutist
theory of the function of law and its position that the constitutional order must
enable the executive to act when necessary to protect the state, as elaborated by
James I, and later Thomas Hobbes. However, it is not compatible with the
constitutional settlement of the English Civil War and the delimiting of
executive powers after the Glorious Revolution, in which English jurists
explicitly rejected James and Hobbes’s ideas of sovereignty.
In the Aphorisms on Universal Justice, Bacon argues that private rights are
subordinate to the rights of the sovereign, since “[p]rivate right depends upon
the protection of public right. For the law protects the people, and magistrates
protect the laws; but the authority of the magistrates depends upon the
sovereign power of the government [not, as in medieval constitutionalism, on
the natural law].”401 This passage betrays Bodin’s influence, his Six Books
having been published in English fifteen years earlier.402 In particular, it is
possible to detect how in this later work Bacon rejects both the rule of law and
his earlier acknowledgement that penal statues must be strictly construed:

398. See, e.g., Daniel E. Seward, Civic Voice in Elizabethan Parliamentary Oratory: The
Rhetoric and Composition of Speeches Delivered at Westminster in 1566, at 111–56 (May 2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin) (on file with author)
(discussing Onslowe’s case).
399. See Venezky, supra note 385, at 60.
400. Allen D. Boyer, Light, Shadow, Science, and Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1622, 1627 (1993).
401. 9 FRANCIS BACON, THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 312 (James Spedding et al. eds.,
1864) (emphasis added).
402. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY: GOD, STATE, AND SELF 95 (2008).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

410

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:355

Fresh cases [involving alleged wrongs that are not recognized as crimes at
common law or by statute] happen in criminal causes which require
punishment . . . .
Let the Censorian Courts have power and jurisdiction, not only to punish
new offences, but also to increase the punishments appointed by law [i.e., by
statute] for old ones . . . . For an enormous crime has somewhat of the nature
403
of a new one.

To understand what Bacon means by “Censorian Courts,” which are
undefined in this text, one must turn to Bacon’s History of the Reign of King
Henry VII, where he argues that the “Star-chamber had the Censorian
power,”404 and therefore was a sort of court of criminal equity,405 which could
severely punish wrongs that were not crimes, despite the fact that the
jurisdiction of the Star Chamber had been carefully defined by statute, and
both Parliament and the Justices had repeatedly rejected attempts to expand
that jurisdiction.406 Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that as “Bacon
sought to regularize English law” by way of “a kind of codification,”407 his
“New Digest of the Law” would have contained a theory of sovereignty that
granted the Stuart monarchs the same powers as the kings of France.
Finally, in his Aphorisms on the Law of Nations, Bacon indicated how he
hoped emergency powers could justify the introduction of absolute royal
power into English law:
[I]t must be noted that legal bonds do not prevail in all cases. . . . If the power
of any subject is so great that when he commits a crime he is safe from
prosecution, then a king, who puts this subject to death without a legal
proceeding, does not break the law. . . . [For] the safety of a private person is
408
owed to the state, particularly in times of danger.

Here, Bacon repeats the exact legal theory that Henry VII had invoked in
his dispute against Robert of Naples, which had been decisively rejected for
running contrary to medieval jurisprudence, which then served as the base for

403. 5 FRANCIS BACON, THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 94–95 (James Spedding et al. eds.,
1858).
404. FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY VII AND SELECTED
WORKS 57 (Brian Vickers ed., 1998) (Bacon compares the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber to the
court of the Roman Censor). See also FRANCIS BACON, BACON’S HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF
KING HENRY VII WITH NOTES 62 (J. Rawson Lumby ed., 1885).
405. FRANCIS LUDLOW HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 38 (1818); SIR DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 28 (9th ed. 1969).
406. Alford, supra note 306, 645–53.
407. Boyer, supra note 400, at 1628.
408. Mark S. Neustadt, The Making of the Instauration: Science, Politics, and Law in the
Career of Francis Bacon 296–97 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins
University) (microformed on University Microfilms Dissertation Information Services, 1990)
(emphasis added).
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medieval constitutionalism.409 This decretal had established that exigent
circumstances could never excuse the king from the requirement that a subject
be given an opportunity to defend themselves at law.410 To justify his own
view, Bacon rejects constitutionalism (and foreshadows the work of his
admirer Hobbes), writing that since laws change, “It follows necessarily that
there is in any commonwealth a certain power above the laws, that can abolish
them and make them anew . . . . [T]he authority of laws does not depend upon
consent alone, but wholly upon ruling authority [imperium].”411
Bacon’s conception of imperium (and of Roman law generally) is
fundamentally flawed. Betraying ignorance of all the medieval commentary on
Digna Vox and the differences between Byzantine and Roman theories of
imperium, he states that:
[I]n the Imperial Roman law . . . there was the opinion . . . that for any law
either proposed or already submitted, the people had already transferred their
universal power to the Emperor. . . . [O]nce the supreme power has
transformed itself, [i.e., it has been given by the people to the sovereign] it
412
cannot be restored to its former state.

As both a matter of law and of history, this assertion is incorrect.
“In law by his concept of the legal maxim [Bacon] hoped to stand higher
than Coke in the eyes of posterity and by his digests of case and statute law to
emulate on English soil the innovations of Justinian.”413 However, “if Bacon
wanted to be an English Trebonianus, James . . . could not be an English
Justinian,”414 owing to the fierce resistance of the common lawyers, namely the
opposition in Parliament of Whitelocke, St. John, Coke, and Alford. Bacon
wrote, “I am in good hope, that when Sir Edward Coke’s Reports and my
Rules and Decisions shall come to posterity, there will be (whatsoever is now
thought) question who was the greater lawyer.”415 The answer of posterity is
obvious. Following his impeachment in 1621 and the abolition of his beloved
Star Chamber in 1641,416 Bacon’s legal work became a historical footnote.
Coke, who told James that he could not sit in judgment personally, who in
judgment held that the judiciary had the power to strike down unconstitutional
proclamations, and who authored the Petition of Right (which specified that

409. See PENNINGTON, supra note 176, at 190–201.
410. Id.
411. Bacon, supra note 384, at 281.
412. Id. at 285.
413. Paul H. Kocher, Francis Bacon on the Science of Jurisprudence, 1 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 3
(1957).
414. Id. at 16.
415. PEREZ ZAGORIN, FRANCIS BACON 196 (1998).
416. See Damian X. Powell, Why Was Sir Francis Bacon Impeached? The Common Lawyers
and the Chancery Revisited: 1621, 84 HIST. 511, 513 (1996).
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the king had no emergency powers to ignore the laws) became a hero to
generations of constitutionalists, including the Framers.
B.

Maxims of the Common Law Related to Salus Populi After Bacon

Bacon’s legal work was ignored by posterity, with one exception. His
Elizabethan Maxims, owing perhaps to their moderation, became an inspiration
to treatise-writers, who emulated his example in producing collections of legal
principles. These followers, as this section will demonstrate, were much more
modest, noting that they needed to rely on precedent, and in general refrain
from synthesizing what were purportedly new rules. In these treatises the
strong interpretation of salus populi given by Bacon (and Paulsen and Gross)
had been rejected by eighteenth-century Anglo-American legal thought.
The first jurists to follow Bacon’s example and produce a book of maxims
was William Noy. His The Principal Grounds and Maxims with Analysis of the
Laws of England is also an implicit rebuttal to some of Bacon’s assertions.417
Indeed, wherever he departs from Bacon, one can discern some clear intent to
make a point, since he otherwise follows Bacon very closely. Noy made no
attempt to cast his maxims as rules or regulae but merely “grounds” (what
Bacon called placitis).418
Noy also makes no direct mention of the salus populi, which seems solid
evidence that it was not a recognized concept within common law thought at
the time. He comes to this maxim when illustrating the principle that “[t]he law
favours things for the good of the commonwealth,”419 but he makes no stronger
case for executive power than saying that “if a sheriff pursue a felon to a
house, and to apprehend the felon, he breaks open the door of a house, he may
justify it.”420 He does not even imply that the king has any power to act against
the laws or otherwise take advantage of his subjects in emergencies, except
perhaps for the perennial example of allowing a house to be knocked down to
prevent the spread of a conflagration. In the manner befitting a common
lawyer, Noy does not attempt to derive a general principle from this custom,
and instead notes cautiously that the citizen’s house must already be
“burning.”421
Noy’s discussion of the maxims related to the doctrine of necessity also
provides a counterpoint to Bacon. He cleaves closely to Bacon’s discussion of

417. WILLIAM NOY, THE PRINCIPAL GROUNDS AND MAXIMS WITH ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS
(1824).
418. Id.; 7 FRANCIS BACON, THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 358 (James Spedding et al.
eds., 1879).
419. WILLIAM WALLER HENING, MAXIMS IN LAW AND EQUITY 32 (9th ed. 1824) (citing
Noy’s Maxim 26).
420. Id.
421. Id.
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private necessity,422 but he adds one gloss not found in the Maxims. Citing the
reports of that great constitutionalist justice Edmund Plowden, he notes that the
king’s power to act out of necessity was limited by a statute that had become
part of the fundamental laws of England: “[B]efore the statute of Magna
Charta, the King might enter into another’s woods, and cut the trees for
reparations of castles.”423 Here, Noy impliedly asserts that the king cannot act
out of necessity in a way that has been foreclosed by the law. This is a
rejection of the broader interpretations of the doctrine salus populi suprema lex
est, as here it is the Great Charter that is the supreme law, such that it prevails
over even the principles of public necessity.
The third major compilation of maxims of the early modern era was
written by an anonymous “Gentleman of Middle Temple” in 1751.424 For the
first time, salus populi suprema lex est is listed as a separate maxim in its own
right.425 Several precedents formerly listed (in Noy and Bacon) under the
headings of the maxims related to necessity are found in this section, which
details the right to “raze houses in publico incendio” and to erect “bulwarks
upon another’s land” or to “[turn] the plough upon the head-land of
another.”426 These precedents all create defenses for members of the public and
confer no rights upon the government.427
The Gentleman makes no mention of any right of the king to act
unilaterally to safeguard the security of the state or its population in his
discussions of the maxims related to private necessity.428 He also omits
Bacon’s principle that necessity is not a defense against the crown.429 Lastly, in
his discussion of the rule that penal statutes are not to be construed by equity,
he makes a stronger case in more general language. The maxim here is phrased
“statutes penal to be construed strictly,” turning a negative statement into a
stronger positive proscription.430 This rejects the argument for investing any
court with the Censorian authority, as Bacon had argued the Star Chamber
possessed in his Aphorisms. The Gentleman’s statement of the rule also
contains no exceptions.431
It should be noted that this particular book of maxims was frequently
found in the libraries of colonial lawyers during the revolutionary period

422. Id.
423. NOY, supra note 417, at 36–37.
424. A GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, THE GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS OF LAW AND
EQUITY (2d ed. 1751) [hereinafter THE GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS OF LAW AND EQUITY].
425. Id. at 312.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. See id.
429. THE GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS OF LAW AND EQUITY, supra note 424, at 217–19.
430. Id. at 317.
431. Id.
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(1761–1783) and in the libraries of the Framers during that time.432
Accordingly, it is now evident that the idea that the executive should have
broad powers to protect the public welfare during an emergency—if indeed it
was known to the Framers—did not come from the maxims or principles of the
common law at the time, just as it could not have come from Cicero, from the
history of Roman or medieval constitutionalism, and certainly not from their
heroes amongst the Parliamentarian opposition to the Stuarts in the seventeenth
century. However, since this maxim is frequently traced to John Locke, one
must consider whether his words comprise support for the interpretation given
to it by Paulsen and Gross.
VII. JOHN LOCKE, THE MAXIM, AND THE HOBBESIAN EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
It is indisputable that John Locke influenced the Framers, and it is likewise
impossible to deny that on the title page of the Two Treatises of Government,
the phrase “salus populi suprema lex est” is found directly beneath the author’s
name.433 Locke, in the section of his treatise which comes directly before his
discussion of executive privilege, made use of the maxim, saying: “Salus
populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and fundamental a rule, that he, who
sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err.”434 Accordingly, a case might be
made that at the time of the framing the view that the executive should have
the power to transcend the constitution in a time of crisis was part of the
consensus, owing to Locke’s views on government. However, it will be
evident after a detailed review of the Two Treatises that Locke did not in fact
advocate this view, and accordingly that he cannot be a source for these views
at the time of the American Revolution.
A.

The Misrepresentation of Locke’s Views on Executive Privilege

Locke’s views on executive power have lately been mischaracterized.435
While it has long been the conventional wisdom to ascribe views to Locke that
were largely in conformity with his whig and puritan contemporaries, this view
was jettisoned in the twentieth century, and “Locke has thus been made out to
be very like Hobbes.”436 This revisionism can be ascribed largely to the
neoconservative theorist Leo Strauss437 and his pupil Richard H. Cox:

432. See Howell J. Heaney, A Signer of the Declaration of Independence Orders Books from
London: Two Documents of George Read of Delaware in the Hampton L. Carson Collection of
the Free Library of Philadelphia, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 172, 173, 178 (1958).
433. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (6th prtg. 1764).
434. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 80 (J. W. Gough ed., 3d ed.
1966).
435. J. W. Gough, Introduction to LOCKE, supra note 434, at vii.
436. Id. at xxiii.
437. See SHADIA B. DRURY, LEO STRAUSS AND THE AMERICAN RIGHT 199 n.8 (1999).
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It is largely Locke’s partnership with Hobbes in promoting this alleged
drastic deterioration of the European natural-law tradition which Leo Strauss
has been concerned to expose in his treatment of Locke, and a former pupil of
438
his, Richard H. Cox, has analysed exhaustively . . . in the Two Treatises.

Their influential account of Locke, which posits that his vision of
executive power constitutes a clear break with earlier constitutionalist views
was subjected to Dunn’s criticism:
The argument ex silentio . . . is deployed on the basis of a crude and questionbegging biographical hypothesis and in a fashion which repeatedly ignores the
characters of the texts analysed. . . .
....
There are two major points at which Cox misrepresents Locke’s position.
The first is his assertion of primacy of right over duty and the second is the
meaning he gives to the primacy of security over consumption. . . .
. . . [I]t is not a defensible analysis of Locke’s work to turn it in this
439
fashion into an apology for the machtstaat.

J. W. Gough also responded negatively to the revisionist view that equated
Locke and Hobbes’s ideas:
So paradoxical a conclusion should surely make the critics pause.
Admittedly one can find resemblances between the political doctrines of
Hobbes and Locke, but it is not difficult to think of wide areas of divergence:
for example, Hobbes’s sovereign [like Bodin’s] is not only undivided but
indivisible, whereas Locke separates executive and legislative, and rejects
“arbitrary” personal power. . . . Locke himself . . . spoke of Hobbes and
Spinoza as “justly decried names.” . . . . He wrote to . . . refute Filmer’s
patriarchal version of the divine right of kings. . . . Filmer and Hobbes held
similar views about law and sovereignty, so that rejection of the one involved
440
rejection of the other also.

Gough explained that the key to understanding Locke is to understand his
influences, which are precisely those influences that Hobbes rejected:
[H]e was the inheritor from the middle ages of an ancient tradition which had
come down, continually being modified in the process, from . . . the Roman
jurists. Locke inherited this tradition . . . partly perhaps from other English
writers . . . who had used the concept of the law of nature in a reply to
441
Hobbes.

Accordingly, to discern the meaning of the salus populi quotation from
The Two Treatises, one must first understand that Locke believed that the

438.
439.
440.
441.

JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE 158 (1969).
Id. at 160.
Gough, supra note 435, at xxiv–xxv.
Id. at xxi.
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executive is normally bound to observe the laws. However, Locke noted that
the duties of the executive flow from two sorts of obligations.442 One is
contractual, while the second comes from the law of trusts.443 The first of these
is a conventional idea drawn from medieval constitutionalism, while the
second is more innovative.444 Pursuant to this second source of duties, Locke
held that the legislature and the executive are given a power akin to that of a
trustee over the public welfare, insofar as they are not bound to perform
particular actions, but rather to attempt to achieve certain ends and to prioritize
the well-being of the beneficiaries.445
Locke also believed that the executive power needs prerogative powers
because they are entrusted with the duty to preserve the state. While he
concluded that the executive may exercise its prerogative “against the direct
letter of the law,”446 it could only ignore those positive laws of the state that do
not establish or shape the fiduciary relationship between the executive and the
citizenry. For Locke, the creation of the trust that created the prerogative
powers flowed from the specific promises of the executive to govern in
accordance with the constitutional order.447 The key difference between
Locke’s view and Hobbes’s is Locke’s view of the function of these promises:
“[P]romises . . . even bind the Almighty. . . . [T]his stress on the status of
promises is one of the taboos which the exponents of raison d’état [Bodin,
Hobbes] regarded with the greatest contempt, as the merest superstition.”448
Dunn asks and answers the vital question about Locke’s invocation of the
maxim:
What then are we to make of Locke himself when he says that whoever
sincerely follows the Rule Salus Populi Suprema Lex ‘cannot dangerously err’
. . . ? One possibility is to point severely to the context in which he uses this
particular expression . . . [and] insist that it does not involve any breach of a
promise or oath . . . . [and note] that if Locke wished to exempt princes from

442. See RANDALL LESAFFER, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVE 388 (2009).
443. Martyn P. Thompson, Locke’s Contract in Context, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM
HOBBES TO RAWLS 73, 75 (David Boucher & Paul Kelly eds., 1994).
444. Brian Tierney, Corporatism, Individualism, and Consent: Locke and Premodern
Thought, in LAW AS PROFESSION AND PRACTICE IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 49, 66 (Kenneth
Pennington & Melodie Harris Eichbauer eds., 2011).
445. A. JOHN SIMMONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARCHY: LOCKE, CONSENT, AND THE LIMITS OF
SOCIETY 71–72 (1993).
446. LOCKE, supra note 434, at 84.
447. Locke derived these views from his mentor George Lawson. See JULIAN H. FRANKLIN,
JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY 53–86 (1981).
448. DUNN, supra note 438, at 162.
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their obligations he would be in the odd position of supposing Charles II (or,
449
later, William III) not to be bound by a practice which bound God himself.

It is obvious that Locke—unlike such theorists as Gabriel Naudé, who
followed Bodin and “used the salus populi axiom to justify virtually any sort of
evil in order that public good might come of it,”450—had a more modest idea in
mind. Like Cicero, he hoped that the trustee of the public welfare would
consider the health of the people as their foremost guiding principle. There is
no support for the conclusion that he intended that the maxim should justify the
executive’s breaking their promises and disregarding the constitution. This
would have required a theory of undivided and unbounded sovereignty, while
Locke had written Two Treatises precisely to rebut this theory —as espoused
by Filmer, and later, Hobbes.451
B.

The Framers’ Rejection of Hobbes

If Thomas Hobbes was a key influence on the Framers, then it is possible
that a much more robust vision of executive power and a strong version of the
maxim of salus populi might have been contemplated by the founding fathers.
However, since there is ample evidence that Hobbes’s view on these subjects is
entirely inconsistent with Locke’s, it is unlikely that this is the case. Even those
who advocate this theory admit that “[t]he most generous view of Hobbes’s
influence is that the Founders generally accepted his view of the problem of
politics while rejecting his solution.”452 Hobbes (the so-called “monster of
Malmsbury”453) was seen by the entire founding generation as an opponent of
freedom. This opinion was shared by both patriots and loyalists:
Writers the colonists took to be opponents of Enlightenment rationalism—
primarily Hobbes, Filmer, Sibthorpe, Mandeville, and Mainwaring—were
denounced as frequently by loyalists as by patriots . . . . [W]ith the exception
of Filmer none of the authors . . . were in fact referred to favorably by
454
Tories.

Hobbes was also denounced and rejected by one of the key legal theorists
of the previous century, one who was held in high esteem by the Framers, Sir
Matthew Hale, who authored several influential treatises. His History and

449. Id. at 163–64.
450. Id. at 163.
451. STERLING POWER LAMPRECHT, THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN
LOCKE 41–42 (1918).
452. Gary L. McDowell, Private Conscience and Public Order: Hobbes and The Federalist,
25 POLITY 421, 424 (1993).
453. LAURA LUNGER KNOPPERS, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LITERATURE AND THE
ENGLISH REVOLUTION 394, 407 n.2 (2012).
454. PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 45, at 25.
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Analysis of the Common Law of England455 was a mainstay of the
constitutionalist tradition. For the purposes of this Article, however, another
work of Hale’s is particularly pertinent: his Reflections on Hobbes’s Dialogue
of the Laws,456 which illustrates the vast gulf between the constitutionalist
tradition that influenced the Framers and the theory of sovereignty that they
rejected.
Hobbes’s dialogue had been a strenuous criticism of Coke; following
Bodin, he argued that “Law . . . is the command of a sovereign which, though
it may be iniquitous, cannot be unjust. Neither case law, nor custom, is truly
law.”457 Hobbes believed that the sovereign’s power knew no bounds: “[T]hese
laws cannot bind him, since otherwise he would lose his supreme power to
keep order.”458 Like his royalist antecedents, he claimed that the subjects of the
sovereign cede to it all of their natural rights, as condition of the protection that
the sovereign provides from the potential war of all against all; in order to
provide this protection, the sovereign had a right to demand undivided and
unlimited authority.459 As Hale summarized Hobbes’s views: “[T]here can be
no qualifications or modification of the power of a sovereign prince . . . . [H]e
alone is judge of all public dangers and may appoint such remedies as he
please and impose what charges he thinks fit in order thereunto.”460
Conversely, Hale championed the traditional view461—the constitution
may “in many cases hinder the kings acts and make them void if they are
against law.”462 It is not surprising that Hale would be unsympathetic to
Hobbes’s views, since constitutionalism imposes limitations “on the
sovereignty of the lawmaking power.”463 This is a natural consequence of the
fact that the constitutionalist lawyers had “emphasized the ancient tradition of
limitations upon the royal prerogative.”464

455. SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (1713).
456. Sir Matthew Hale, Reflections on Hobbes’s Dialogue of the Laws, in 5 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 500 (1973). This was not printed in Hale’s lifetime,
although it circulated in manuscript form and was frequently copied, as was Hobbes’s work
before it was itself posthumously printed. See also Sir Frederick Pollock, Sir Matthew Hale on
Hobbes, 37 L.Q. REV. 274, 274–75 (1921).
457. Pollock, supra note 456, at 277.
458. Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale 103
YALE L. REV. 1651, 1718 (1994).
459. Id.
460. Pollock, supra note 456, at 297 (author’s translation from Early Modern to Modern
English).
461. See, e.g., HENRY FINCH, LAW, A DISCOURSE THEREOF 75 (4th ed. 1759) (laws contrary
to the natural law “lose their force, and are no laws at all”).
462. Pollock, supra note 456, at 283.
463. Berman, supra note 458, at 1708.
464. Id.
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Hale “countered Hobbes’ ideal type not with only moral and political
arguments but also with the reality of English constitutional history, to which
he attached normative significance,”465 pointing in particular to the boundaries
on the powers of the executive, which he argued were desirable.466 He noted
that the king was bound by his coronation oath to observe the nation’s
fundamental laws, and that those laws, as named in such acts as the Magna
Carta, particularly mentioned the liberties of the subject.467 In doing so, he
argued that “the sovereignty of the king exists within a legal framework.”468
Drawing on a tradition that extends as far back as Bracton, he asserted that the
king is not above the law, but is constrained by those very laws that give him
legitimacy.469
Hale’s response attests to the essential continuity of English legal
thought,470 reviving the argument that:
[Owing to] the great solemnity of the oath which he takes at his coronation to
observe and keep those laws and liberties . . . no man can make a question
whether [the king] be not in the sight of God and by the bond of natural justice
471
be obliged to keep it.

Furthermore, he answered Hobbes’ argument that the sovereign required
unlimited powers to protect the public in unforeseen emergencies by saying:
[I]t is a madness to think that the model of laws of government is to be framed
according to such circumstances as very rarely occur. It is as if a man should
make agaric and rhubarb his ordinary diet, because it is of use when he is sick,
472
which may be once in seven years.

Finally, when addressing the question of the Framers’ vision of executive
power, one must remember that one of the key objections the patriot party had
with existing British constitutional theory was its turn to a theory of
sovereignty that drew heavily upon continental theory,473 much to the chagrin
of their colonial subjects, who cleaved to the theory of the ancient constitution
and the fundamental law tradition.474 The American patriots believed that
“Parliament had adopted wholeheartedly the doctrine of sovereignty as stated
by Hobbes, that in every state there must be a sovereign, uncontrolled by law

465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

Id. at 1719.
Hale, supra note 456, at 508.
Id. at 507–08.
Berman, supra note 458, at 1720.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 348, at 507–08.
See Berman, supra note 458, at 1702–21.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 348, at 511.
Id. at 512.
JOHN PHILIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE
AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 17–21 (1986).
474. Id.
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. . . a theory of law that had cost Charles I his head and James II his throne,”475
as the English Parliament had adopted the theory of sovereignty that “emerged
with the writings of Thomas Hobbes . . . departing from the common law
tradition and from the constitutionalism that would dominate American legal
thought both before the Revolution and into the age of the early republic.”476
Accordingly, the burden of proof is squarely on those who assert that the
Framers had adopted a view of sovereignty that was Hobbesian and
fundamentally antithetical to Hobbes’s.477 This is what Paulsen has argued,
against the great weight of all of the historical evidence adduced above. He has
not met his obligation to refute, or indeed even address this argument.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that it is certainly not the case that the
preservation of a constitutional order requires the state to vest the executive
with the power to ignore its constitution. No other previously existing
constitutional state had done so, and they frequently rejected rulers’ attempts to
create the constitutional metaprinciple that Paulsen prizes.
Since the Roman Republic, states with mixed constitutions have invariably
limited the emergency powers of their executives, since the abuse of this
privilege has been rightly regarded as more dangerous to the constitution than
any external threat. Following Polybius’s conception of the cycle of
constitutions, the theorists of antiquity noted that a ruler “will ask for
extraordinary powers to cope with . . . violent opposition. Once he has obtained
these powers, together with command over an armed force that obeys him
blindly, he becomes a tyrant.”478 While Cicero had pressed very hard for such
extraordinary powers, he was repeatedly rebuked for doing so and ultimately
sent into exile. Having learned his lesson about the unacceptability of these
proposals, he abandoned them in the comprehensive program for the reform of
the republican constitution found in his The Laws.
Cicero’s conviction drove home the principle that—even after passage of
the senatus consultum ultimum—Consuls were required to observe certain
constitutional norms. These precluded such actions as Rabirius’s murder of
Saturninus and the Senate’s execution of Lentulus. Even in emergencies, the
executive was required to observe the laws that provided the accused with due
process and the right of appeal. In the imperial period, the executive was still
bound to observe these laws. While Trebonian and Justinian distorted Ulpian’s

475. ARTHUR L. GOODHART, LAW OF THE LAND 60 (1966).
476. REID, supra note 473, at 64.
477. See VINCENT OSTROM, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF A COMPOUND REPUBLIC xxix
(1987) (describing Hobbes’s view of sovereignty).
478. KURT VON FRITZ, THE THEORY OF THE MIXED CONSTITUTION IN ANTIQUITY 65 (1975).
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jurisprudence to give the Byzantine emperors more powers, they were still held
to be morally bound to observe the laws by Digna Vox.
Medieval constitutionalism shows how this Roman theory of mixed
government and limited powers was rediscovered and pressed into service as
the cornerstone of early European theories of regal power. Legalistic
interpretations of Digna Vox created powerful limits on a king’s ability to
deviate from the ordo iudicarius when they contended that civil emergencies
demanded that the defendant receive less than due process would otherwise
require. The Magna Carta and the Saepe Contingit established that kings did
not have a constitutional power to dispense with the laws in emergencies (in
countries governed by the common law and the ius commune, respectively).
Jean Bodin’s theory of undivided and unlimited sovereignty was a radical
break with existing legal theory. It was adopted in France in order to justify
Charles IX’s blatant criminality in the wake of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day
massacre. However, when the Stuarts attempted to transplant this theory of
strong executive power into England, the legal profession led the successful
resistance to this drive towards absolutism. The early Stuart monarchs
attempted to justify an unbounded executive privilege by arguing that they
could ignore the laws when protecting the country in a time of emergency. The
incompatibility between this assertion and medieval constitutionalism was
exposed in three key cases, which led to a backlash against strong executive
powers in general and broad emergency powers in particular.
The jurists who decried these attempts to smuggle absolutism into the
common law through the back door of emergency powers—such as Lord Coke
and Sir Matthew Hale—subsequently became heroes to the founding fathers.
Likewise, Sir Francis Bacon’s attempt to introduce these principles into the
maxims of the common law failed, as jurists such as William Noy rooted out
Bacon’s corruptions from later books of maxims. By the time of the framing,
influential books of maxims explicitly disavowed the notion that the executive
can ignore the law in defense of the state, as evidenced by the remarks of the
anonymous “Gentleman of Middle Temple” in a treatise that found its way into
the libraries of the Framers.
Finally, this Article demonstrated that the Framers might have derived a
strong theory of executive defense of the salus populi from their exposure to
John Locke’s use of this concept. While Locke held that the executive could
ignore the technicalities of law to preserve public welfare (since he was not
specifically bound by such means as the coronation oath to observe all the
laws), he in fact did make explicit promises to uphold the fundamental laws
(i.e., the constitution), a commitment which Locke clearly held to be not only
binding, but unbreakable. There is ample evidence that the Framers read Locke
correctly as a rejection of Filmer and Hobbes’s views on sovereignty, since
they embraced Locke and abhorred Hobbes.
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All of the founding fathers’ intellectual influences pointed them away from
the theory of executive powers that Paulsen and others believe to be implicit
within the Constitution of the United States. Accordingly, in addition to
showing that a strong theory of executive privilege to defend the salus populi
is not necessary to the preservation of the constitutional order, this history
demonstrates something else. Namely, it illustrates that there was a strong
presumption against an executive privilege to ignore the laws, such that the
Framers—had they decided to depart from two thousand years of
constitutionalist tradition—would have incorporated it explicitly. In view of
this history and its influence on the Framers, the argument that the Constitution
adopted this view implicitly is absurd.
A constitution without an executive privilege to ignore its limits is not a
suicide pact: constitutions without this have survived for centuries. Rather, it is
merely a constitutional order that would require the executive, should he
ignore the constitution in order to protect the public, to accept responsibility
and the possibility of punishment for its actions. Should the people conclude
that this was necessary, although unconstitutional—as with Lincoln’s
suspension of habeas corpus—there will likely be no repercussions.479
However, pretending that the executive has an implicit constitutional power to
ignore the constitution whenever he or she deems necessary gives them the
power to break the laws with impunity, something that constitutionalist writers
since Polybius have concluded will pave the way to tyranny.

479. See Abraham Lincoln, Amnesty to Political or State Prisoners (Feb. 14 ,1862), in 2
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: COMPLETE WORKS, COMPRISING HIS SPEECHES, LETTERS, STATE PAPERS,
AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 123–25 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1894).

